Subsea Workover Safety System Segregation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional subsea workover safety systems lack adequate separation from process control systems, leading to potential risks and inefficiencies in implementing safety functions such as Emergency Shutdown (ESD) and Emergency Quick Disconnect (EQD), which are critical for protecting personnel, environment, and assets in hydrocarbon production operations.

Innovation Solution

A physically segregated Workover Safety System (WSS) is designed to override the Workover Control System (WCS) by using a second controller that is independent in both hardware and software, capable of executing safety functions independently, reducing response times and eliminating the need for certain components during shutdown events, and incorporating features like reduced critical valves and a bleed-off function.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Device complexity

If safety functions are integrated into the process control system, then system complexity is reduced, but safety reliability deteriorates due to potential interference from process control operations

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesystem complexityVSAvoidsafety reliability
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent divides the control system into two separate entities: a process control system for normal operations and a dedicated safety system for safety-critical functions. This segmentation ensures that safety functions are physically and functionally isolated from process control operations, preventing potential interference while maintaining overall system manageability through defined interfaces.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If a dedicated safety system is implemented, then safety reliability improves, but device complexity increases due to additional hardware and software components

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesafety reliabilityVSAvoiddevice complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts safety-critical functions from the process control system into a dedicated safety system. This extraction isolates safety functions from potentially interfering process control operations while maintaining necessary interactions through well-defined interfaces, thereby improving safety reliability without completely isolating the systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

3Reliability

If the safety system is physically segregated from the control system, then safety independence improves, but response time may increase due to additional communication interfaces

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesafety independenceVSAvoidresponse time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces defined communication interfaces as intermediaries between the process control system and the safety system. These interfaces enable efficient information exchange and coordinated operation while maintaining the physical and functional separation required for safety independence, thereby minimizing response time delays.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS10704352B2Safety system for overriding hydrocarbon control module
Publication Date: 2020.07.07 ONESUBSEA AS
  • US10704352B2 patent drawing
  • US10704352B2 patent drawing
  • US10704352B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Example embodiments presented herein are directed towards a safety system, for example a subsea workover safety system, for overriding a control module configured to actuate a component of a hydrocarbon production apparatus, particularly an apparatus comprising at least one of a lower riser package and an emergency disconnect package.