Software TPM Isolation for Scalable VM Attestation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing virtual machine (VM) workloads requiring binary compatibility and Trusted Platform Module (TPM) attestation face challenges due to confusion between virtual and hardware TPMs, frequent software updates invalidating attestation evidence, and scalability limitations of hardware TPMs, especially in cloud environments with frequent workload migrations.

Innovation Solution

Implementing a software TPM (swTPM) using Trust Domain Extension (TDX) and/or Software Guard Extension (SGX) as the root of trust, creating secure execution environments isolated from the hypervisor and operating system, enabling seamless updates and attestation without relying on hardware TPMs.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If a virtual TPM (vTPM) is used to provide attestation for virtualized workloads, then scalability and flexibility are improved, but confusion between virtual and hardware TPM representations arises, complicating verification processes

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvescality and flexibilityVSAvoidverification complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a measurement intermediary that acts as a bridge between the virtualized workload and the verification system. This intermediary collects measurements from multiple sources (hypervisor, vTPM, workload) and presents them as a unified attestation package, resolving the confusion between hardware and virtual TPM representations while maintaining verification simplicity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The patent segments the attestation process into distinct measurement components (hypervisor measurements, vTPM measurements, workload measurements) that are collected separately and then combined. This segmentation allows each component to be verified independently while presenting a unified view to the verifier, reducing overall verification complexity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Reliability

If frequent software updates are performed to maintain security, then security posture is improved, but attestation evidence becomes invalid, requiring re-attestation

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity postureVSAvoidattestation re-validation time
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary measurement collection during the software update process itself. By capturing measurements at key update milestones and storing them for later verification, the system allows attestation to be validated without requiring complete re-attestation, thus maintaining security while reducing re-validation time

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent establishes continuous measurement collection that operates throughout the software update lifecycle. Rather than interrupting operation for re-attestation, measurements are continuously gathered and made available for verification, maintaining both security posture and operational continuity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #20Continuity of useful action

3Reliability

If hardware TPMs are used to provide root of trust, then security is improved, but scalability is limited by the cost and power consumption of dedicated TPM hardware in each system on chip

Engineering Contradiction:
ImprovesecurityVSAvoidscalability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent creates a virtual copy of the TPM functionality that runs as software within the virtualized environment. This vTPM replicates the security functions of a hardware TPM without requiring dedicated physical hardware in each SoC, enabling scalable deployment across multiple virtualized workloads while maintaining security through cryptographic equivalence to hardware TPM

Inventive Principle:
Principle #26Copying

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces the mechanical hardware TPM system with a software-based implementation. By substituting physical TPM hardware with a software emulator that provides equivalent cryptographic functions, the system achieves scalability without sacrificing the security properties that hardware TPMs provide

Inventive Principle:
Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

4Productivity

If traditional virtualization is used to host workloads, then resource utilization is improved, but the virtualization layer is exposed to software vulnerabilities that compromise security

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveresource utilizationVSAvoidsoftware vulnerabilities
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements nested virtualization with a trust domain nested within the traditional virtualization layer. The inner trust domain provides an additional security boundary that isolates critical attestation functions from vulnerabilities in the outer virtualization layer, allowing resource sharing while protecting against software attacks

Inventive Principle:
Principle #7Nested doll (Nesting)

Data Source

PatentEP4700620A1Method and system for implementing software trusted platform module for a virtual machine
Publication Date: 2026.02.25 INTEL CORP
  • EP4700620A1 patent drawingFigure 1~2
  • EP4700620A1 patent drawingFigure 3
  • EP4700620A1 patent drawingFigure 4

AI summary

A method and system for implementing software trusted platform module (swTPM) for a virtual machine (VM). A guest VM is set up in the system. A tenant trust domain (TTD) or a Software Guard Extension (SGX) enclave is also set up in the system, and a swTPM for the guest VM is executed within the TTD or the SGX enclave. The tenant workload and the guest VM may be measured, and the measurements may be extended into Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) in the swTPM via a swTPM interface in the guest VM. TPM secrets may be stored in a secure storage in the SGX enclave. The TTD may take runtime measurements of the tenant workload, the guest VM, and/or the swTPM.