TADS Protocol Batch Verification for V2V DoS Resilience

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current V2V communication systems face high computational and bandwidth overheads in authenticating messages, particularly in vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) safety applications, due to the reliance on digital signatures and asymmetric key cryptography, which are vulnerable to computational denial-of-service attacks and do not efficiently handle the asymmetry in message rates.

Innovation Solution

The TESLA authentication and digital signature (TADS) protocol, which verifies messages using a combination of digital signatures and TESLA MACs, separates messages by sender ID, discards invalid TESLA MACs, and performs batch verification of digital signatures for valid TESLA MACs to achieve non-repudiation and reduce computational load.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If digital signatures based on asymmetric key cryptography are used for message authentication, then message integrity and non-repudiation are ensured, but computational overhead and bandwidth consumption increase significantly

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage authentication reliabilityVSAvoidcomputational overhead
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The authentication mechanism is segmented into two distinct components: digital signatures for non-repudiation and TESLA MACs for lightweight authentication. This segmentation allows the system to use the computationally intensive digital signature only when necessary (for non-repudiation requirements) while using the efficient TESLA MAC for routine message authentication, thereby reducing overall computational overhead while maintaining reliability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent employs a composite authentication approach by combining digital signatures and TESLA MACs into a unified authentication framework. This composite mechanism leverages the strengths of both approaches: the security and non-repudiation properties of digital signatures and the computational efficiency of symmetric-key TESLA authentication, achieving both reliability and low computational overhead

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

2Reliability

If digital signatures are verified for every received message, then non-repudiation is achieved, but the processor becomes vulnerable to computational denial-of-service attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvenon-repudiation propertyVSAvoidcomputational denial-of-service vulnerability
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

Instead of verifying digital signatures for every message (excessive action), the system performs partial verification by first checking the lightweight TESLA MAC. Only messages with valid TESLA MACs proceed to digital signature verification. This partial action approach maintains non-repudiation for legitimate messages while filtering out malicious messages before they can consume excessive computational resources

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The TESLA MAC serves as an intermediary filtering mechanism between message reception and digital signature verification. This intermediary layer efficiently filters out invalid messages using computationally cheap symmetric-key authentication, preventing malicious messages from reaching the computationally expensive digital signature verification process and thus protecting against DoS attacks

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

3Ease of operation

If public keys are transmitted ahead of messages for authentication, then signature verification is enabled, but bandwidth is consumed

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesignature verification capabilityVSAvoidbandwidth consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the public key distribution requirement from every message by using the periodic public key distribution mechanism of IEEE 1609.2. Receivers maintain cached public keys of known senders, eliminating the need to transmit public keys with every message. This extraction of the public key distribution function reduces bandwidth consumption while maintaining verification capability through caching and periodic updates

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

4Productivity

If all nodes send messages at high rates, then communication efficiency is improved, but the number of messages to verify increases significantly

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage transmission rateVSAvoidmessage verification time
Core Design Contradiction:
ProductivityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The system employs periodic public key distribution and periodic TESLA key disclosure to enable efficient batch verification. By organizing verification around periodic key disclosure events rather than verifying each message individually, the system can process multiple messages more efficiently, reducing the cumulative verification time even as message rates increase

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Data Source

PatentUS8904183B2Efficient technique to achieve non-repudiation and resilience to DoS attacks in wireless networks
Publication Date: 2014.12.02 GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
  • US8904183B2 patent drawing
  • US8904183B2 patent drawing
  • US8904183B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A computationally efficient message verification strategy that achieves non-repudiation and resilience to computational denial of service attacks in conjunction with a broadcast authentication protocol that authenticates messages using a combination of a digital signature and a TESLA MAC. When messages are received at a receiver, the verification strategy separates the messages into messages with the same sender identification. The strategy then determines whether the TESLA MAC authenticator is valid for each message and discards those messages that do not have a valid TESLA MAC. The strategy collects the messages that have a valid TESLA MAC for each sender identification and performs a batch verification process on the group of messages to determine if the messages in the group have a valid digital signature. This strategy verifies each message in the group of messages if the batch verification process shows that the group of messages has a valid digital signature.