Active Tamper Detection Circuit with Bypass Impedance Monitoring

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Solution Overview

Problem

Active tamper protection circuits can be bypassed by connecting a wire between the ends of an active tamper loop, allowing attackers to isolate and manipulate components covered by the mesh, thereby defeating the protection mechanism.

Innovation Solution

An active tamper detection circuit with bypass detection, featuring a voltage comparator and a variable hysteresis control circuit, periodically sweeps the output voltage and compares it to a stored signature to detect impedance changes, powered by a battery to ensure continuous protection even when the main supply is removed.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If a wire (jumper) is connected between the ends of an active tamper loop to simplify the circuit, then the ease of operation is improved, but the reliability of tamper detection deteriorates because the bypass detector cannot distinguish between a legitimate bypass and a tamper attempt

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveease of bypassingVSAvoidreliability of tamper detection
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The bypass detector continuously monitors the impedance of the active tamper loop and compares it against expected values. When a wire jumper is legitimately connected, the system receives feedback about the impedance change and adjusts its detection threshold accordingly, allowing it to distinguish between legitimate bypasses and actual tamper attempts by analyzing the electrical characteristics of the connection

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the parameter being monitored from simple continuity detection to impedance measurement. By measuring the electrical impedance of the tamper loop rather than just detecting presence/absence of a connection, the system can differentiate between a wire jumper (which has specific impedance characteristics) and a tamper attempt (which would have different impedance characteristics), thus maintaining reliability while allowing legitimate bypasses

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

2Reliability

If the bypass detector continuously monitors the active tamper loop to detect tamper attempts, then the reliability of tamper detection is improved, but the energy consumption increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereliability of tamper detectionVSAvoidenergy consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSUse of energy by moving object

Solution Approach 1:

The bypass detector performs periodic impedance measurements of the active tamper loop at predetermined intervals rather than continuous monitoring. This periodic action maintains reliable tamper detection capability while significantly reducing energy consumption compared to continuous monitoring, as the system only activates the detection circuitry at scheduled intervals

Inventive Principle:
Principle #19Periodic action

Solution Approach 2:

The system uses the existing power domain and computational resources of the protected device to perform the bypass detection function. The bypass detector leverages the device's own battery and processing capabilities, eliminating the need for separate dedicated power sources or external monitoring systems, thus minimizing additional energy consumption while maintaining detection reliability

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Device complexity

If the hysteresis control circuit uses fixed thresholds to detect impedance changes, then the device complexity is reduced, but the measurement precision deteriorates because it cannot distinguish between gradual changes due to temperature and abrupt tamper events

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomplexity of hysteresis controlVSAvoidprecision of tamper detection
Core Design Contradiction:
Device complexityVSMeasurement precision

Solution Approach 1:

The hysteresis control circuit uses dynamic thresholds that adapt based on the rate of change of impedance measurements. Instead of fixed thresholds, the system adjusts the detection thresholds dynamically - using tighter thresholds for rapid changes (indicative of tamper events) and more lenient thresholds for gradual changes (indicative of environmental factors like temperature). This dynamic approach maintains measurement precision while avoiding the complexity of full environmental compensation algorithms

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Applied Scientific Principles

This section explains which scientific principles are used to turn an abstract innovation direction into a practical engineering solution.

Function Achieved in This Case

Effectively prevents bypassing by detecting impedance mismatches, ensuring the integrity of the active mesh loop and maintaining protection against tampering attempts, even with small voltage variations or gradual changes due to temperature or process variations.

Implementation Method 1

the bypass detector detects a change in impedance in the mesh when an attacker attempts to bypass the active loop using a wire

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectImpedance detection: Electrical Resistance

Implementation Method 2

the variable hysteresis control circuit periodically sweeps an output voltage of the voltage comparator and store a hysteresis sweep boot-up signature

Methodology Applied
Scientific EffectHysteresis: Hysteresis

Data Source

PatentUS10242955B2Active tamper detection circuit with bypass detection and method therefor
Publication Date: 2019.03.26 NXP USA INC
  • US10242955B2 patent drawing
  • US10242955B2 patent drawing
  • US10242955B2 patent drawing

AI summary

An active tamper detection circuit with bypass detection is provided. A bypass detection circuit is coupled to an active mesh loop. The bypass detector includes a voltage comparator with a variable hysteresis control circuit and a calibration engine. The bypass detector detects a change in impedance in the mesh when an attacker attempts to bypass the active loop using a wire. As part of a boot-up sequence, the calibration engine runs a hysteresis sweep on the voltage comparator and stores a hysteresis sweep boot-up signature. When bypass protection is enabled, the bypass detector runs a hysteresis sweep of the voltage comparator periodically at a predetermined interval. Each sweep generates a generated signature that is compared to the stored boot-up signature. Any signature mismatch will be signaled as an impedance mismatch, or tamper. The hysteresis step size is also programmable. The calibration engine can make small changes to the boot-up signature to allow for small voltage variations.