Tamper-Proof Event Logging for Open Radio Access Networks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Open-radio access networks (O-RANs) face significant security challenges due to network disaggregation and the use of open interfaces, which can lead to unauthorized access and the insertion of fake logs, compromising the integrity and confidentiality of user data and degrading network performance.
Innovation Solution
A method is implemented that includes detecting event logs associated with network components in O-RANs, generating digests from these logs, applying encryption keys to create encrypted digests, and transmitting log information to a service management component for validation. This ensures the authenticity of event logs and prevents the inclusion of fake logs.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If network disaggregation and open interfaces are adopted, then flexibility and scalability are improved, but security and integrity of event logs deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by generating digests and encrypting them before event logs are stored or transmitted. The digest is created from the event log content and then encrypted using the network component's private key, ensuring that any tampering with the log will be detected when the encrypted digest is later verified against the stored log.
Solution Approach 2:
The encrypted digest acts as an intermediary between the event log and the verification process. Instead of directly storing or transmitting the event log content, the system stores the encrypted digest as a protective intermediary that can be verified without exposing the actual log content, thus preventing tampering while maintaining integrity.
2Reliability
If event log authentication mechanisms are implemented, then integrity and authenticity are improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts only the essential authentication information (the digest) from the event log and separates it from the main log content. By taking out just the digest and encrypting it, the system achieves authentication without requiring complex encryption of the entire log file, thus reducing the complexity increase while maintaining security.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of encrypting the entire event log, the system creates a copy of the log content in the form of a digest, then encrypts only this digest. This copying approach allows for efficient verification without processing the full log content, reducing computational complexity while maintaining authenticity.
3Reliability
If encryption keys are applied to event logs, then security and confidentiality are improved, but processing time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system extracts only the necessary cryptographic operations from the entire log processing pipeline. Instead of encrypting and decrypting the full event log content, it only performs these operations on the digest, significantly reducing the processing time while maintaining security. The digest is a condensed representation that requires minimal computational resources.
Solution Approach 2:
The system applies partial action by encrypting only the digest portion of the event log rather than the entire log content. This partial encryption approach provides sufficient security protection for authentication purposes while minimizing the time and computational resources required for processing.
Data Source
AI summary
In an embodiment, operations include detecting a first event log associated with a first network component of an open-radio access network (O-RAN). The operations further include generating a first digest associated with the first event log. The operations further include generating a first encrypted digest from the first digest based on application of the first encryption key on the first digest. The operations further include generating first log information associated with the first network component, based on the first event log and the first encrypted digest. The operations further include transmitting the first log information to a service management component of the O-RAN for validation of an authenticity of the first event log based on the first encrypted digest. The operations further include controlling a first display device to render the first log information based on authenticity of the first event log.


