Tamper-Resistant Chip Device Legitimacy Validation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional methods for establishing secure connections between devices over wireless networks fail to validate the legitimacy of devices appropriately due to the falsifiability of information such as MAC addresses and WEP keys, leading to potential unauthorized access.

Innovation Solution

A network connecting method that utilizes tamper-resistant chips to transmit and verify configuration information between devices, ensuring only authorized devices can establish connections by exchanging and matching configuration information over a short-distance network before allowing secure connections over a long-distance network.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If conventional connection methods using MAC addresses and WEP keys are used, then connection establishment is simple, but device legitimacy cannot be validated appropriately due to information falsification

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedevice legitimacy validationVSAvoidconnection establishment process
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary action by having devices exchange and verify configuration information through short-distance communication before establishing network connections. This pre-verification process ensures device legitimacy is confirmed in advance, preventing unauthorized access while maintaining connection security

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent uses configuration information as an intermediary element that mediates between devices for legitimacy verification. This configuration information, containing device identification and authentication data, serves as a trusted mediator that enables reliable device validation without requiring complex direct verification protocols

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If shared private keys are distributed among devices for secure communication, then confidential wireless communication is achieved, but connection cannot be established to appropriate designation devices

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveconnection accuracyVSAvoidunauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies local quality by making configuration information device-specific and location-aware. Each device has unique configuration information that includes its own identification and authentication credentials, enabling it to verify the legitimacy of specific designation devices while preventing unauthorized connections from other devices

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Ease of operation

If device information such as MAC addresses is used for legitimacy determination, then connection establishment is straightforward, but the information can be falsified by third parties

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveconnection establishmentVSAvoidlegitimacy validation
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies composite materials by creating composite configuration information that combines multiple elements including device identification, authentication credentials, and verification data. This composite structure makes the configuration information resistant to falsification while maintaining ease of operation in connection establishment processes

Inventive Principle:
Principle #40Composite materials

Data Source

PatentUS9660863B2Network connecting method and electronic device
Publication Date: 2017.05.23 FSAS TECH INC
  • US9660863B2 patent drawing
  • US9660863B2 patent drawing
  • US9660863B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A first electronic device transmits first configuration information of the first electronic device collected by a tamper-resistant chip mounted thereon and approved by a third-party device to a second electronic device over a short-distance network. The second electronic device transmits second configuration information of the second electronic device collected by a tamper-resistant chip mounted thereon and approved by the third-party device to the first electronic device over the short-distance network. The first electronic device transmits the first configuration information and the second configuration information to the second electronic device over a network. The second electronic device controls connection between the first electronic device and the second electronic device over the network based on the first configuration information and the second configuration information received from the first electronic device.