Tamper Event Timestamping During Computer Power Outages
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing computer platforms face challenges in detecting and logging physical tampering events during primary power outages, as traditional power-based detection methods fail to record such events when primary power is no longer available, and alternative power sources with microprocessors and RTC circuitry are costly and inefficient.
Innovation Solution
A computer platform equipped with a latch and a time-on-battery timer, powered by secondary power, captures a timestamp during a tampering event, which is then converted to the RTC device's time domain when primary power is restored using a restore controller, eliminating the need for microprocessors and traditional RTC circuitry.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional power-based detection methods are used to detect and log tampering events, then accurate timestamping can be achieved when primary power is available, but detection and logging fail during primary power outages
Solution Approach 1:
The system segments the power supply into primary power (for normal operation) and secondary power (for tampering detection during outages). The secondary power source independently powers the tampering detection circuitry and timestamping mechanism, ensuring that detection capability is separated from the main power dependency. This segmentation allows the detection system to operate autonomously during power outages without requiring complex backup power management for the entire system.
2Reliability
If alternative power sources with microprocessors and RTC circuitry are used to maintain timestamping during power outages, then continuous tampering detection can be achieved, but cost and power consumption increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The invention extracts only the essential functionality needed for tampering detection and timestamping from the complex alternative power system. Instead of using a full microprocessor with RTC circuitry, the system uses a simplified secondary power source that directly powers minimal detection circuitry and a timestamping mechanism. This extraction of essential functions eliminates unnecessary power consumption while maintaining continuous detection capability during outages.
Solution Approach 2:
The system employs a cost-effective secondary power source with simple circuitry designed specifically for the short duration of tampering detection during power outages. Rather than investing in expensive, power-hungry microprocessors and RTC modules, the invention uses economical components that consume minimal power and are sufficient for the specific task of logging tampering events with timestamps during brief outage periods.
3Measurement precision
If alternative power sources with microprocessors and RTC circuitry are used for tampering detection during power outages, then accurate timestamping can be maintained, but system cost increases
Solution Approach 1:
The invention uses economical secondary power source components and simplified circuitry that are cost-effective for manufacturing. The system replaces expensive microprocessors and RTC modules with cheaper, purpose-built detection circuitry that achieves sufficient timestamp accuracy without the overhead of complex, costly components. This approach maintains measurement precision while dramatically reducing system cost and manufacturing complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
A process includes performing actions responsive to secondary power when primary power for a computer platform is unavailable. The actions include providing, by a timer of a computer platform, a timer output that is associated with a first time domain and corresponds to an accumulated time that primary power is unavailable. Moreover, these actions include using secondary power to detect tampering with the computer platform, and responsive to detecting the tampering, reading the timer output to provide a first timestamp that represents a time of detection of the tampering. The process further includes actions which are performed responsive to primary power being subsequently available. These actions include reading data from a non-volatile storage of the computer platform. The data represents a snapshot of a real time clock (RTC) device time that is provided by an RTC device that is powered by the primary power and corresponds to a second time domain. The actions further include transforming the first timestamp into a second timestamp associated with the second time domain based on the snapshot.