TEE Attestation for Malicious-Secure Multi-Party Computation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols struggle to maintain security and privacy under a malicious adversary threat model without incurring high computational and communication costs, as they are typically designed for a weaker honest-but-curious model.
Innovation Solution
Integrate secure MPC protocols with trusted execution environments (TEEs) to ensure that MPC parties adhere to the protocol, using attestation tokens to verify the integrity and security of computations, thereby enhancing the protocol to function under a malicious adversary model with reduced complexity and costs.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If secure MPC protocols are designed for malicious adversary threat model, then security and privacy are improved, but computational and communication costs increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces TEEs as an intermediary trusted execution environment that mediates the MPC protocol execution. The TEE provides hardware-based security guarantees and generates attestation tokens that verify protocol adherence, allowing the system to achieve malicious adversary security without the full computational overhead of traditional MPC protocols. The TEE acts as a mediator between the MPC parties, providing trust verification through attestation.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the complex cryptographic verification mechanisms of traditional MPC protocols with TEE-based hardware attestation. Instead of relying on computationally intensive cryptographic proofs to verify protocol adherence, the system uses TEE hardware to provide cryptographic guarantees and attestation tokens, substituting mechanical cryptographic verification with hardware-based trust verification.
2Reliability
If secure MPC protocols are designed for malicious adversary threat model, then security is improved, but communication costs increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The TEE serves as an intermediary that consolidates trust verification into a single attestation token. Instead of requiring multiple rounds of communication for cryptographic verification between all MPC parties, the TEE generates one attestation token that all parties can verify, significantly reducing communication overhead while maintaining security against malicious adversaries.
3Measurement precision
If TEE attestation is implemented, then protocol adherence verification is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The TEE performs self-attestation by automatically generating attestation tokens that verify its own execution of the MPC protocol. This self-service mechanism eliminates the need for external verification infrastructure, reducing system complexity while maintaining high verification accuracy. The TEE independently proves its adherence to the protocol through hardware-based attestation.
4Device complexity
If traditional MPC protocols are used without TEE, then system simplicity is maintained, but security against malicious adversaries deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The TEE is introduced as a lightweight intermediary that provides security guarantees without significantly increasing system complexity. The attestation token mechanism is simple to implement and verify, allowing the system to maintain relative simplicity while achieving strong security against malicious adversaries through hardware-based trust verification.
Data Source
AI summary
Disclosed herein are systems, methods, and computer-readable media for enabling more secure multi-party computations (MPCs) using a trusted execution environment (TEE). In one aspect, a method includes executing, by a first MPC computer, a secure MPC protocol in a first TEE of the first MPC computer. The first MPC computer generates a request to a second MPC computer executing the secure MPC protocol in a second TEE of the second MPC computer. The first TEE determines that one or more attestation conditions are met by the first MPC computer executing the secure MPC protocol in the first TEE. In response to determining that the one or more attestation conditions are met, the first TEE generates an attestation token including one or more digital signatures for the secure MPC protocol executing in the first TEE. The first MPC computer sends the attestation token with the request to the second MPC computer.