TEE-Attested Secure MPC for Malicious Deviation Prevention
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing secure multi-party computation (MPC) protocols struggle to maintain security and privacy under a malicious adversary threat model without incurring significant computational and communication overhead, and are prone to deviations from the protocol by malicious parties.
Innovation Solution
Integrate secure MPC protocols with trusted execution environments (TEEs) to monitor and attest to the execution of MPC protocols, ensuring they are run in a secure and uncompromised environment, using attestation tokens to verify compliance and prevent unauthorized activities.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If secure MPC protocols are executed without TEE attestation, then computational overhead and communication costs are reduced, but security and reliability under malicious adversary threat model deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a Trusted Execution Environment (TEE) as an intermediary component that mediates between the MPC protocol execution and the malicious adversary threat model. The TEE provides hardware-based attestation mechanisms that verify the integrity of MPC computations without requiring complex cryptographic proofs from each party, thus enhancing security while maintaining computational efficiency.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces complex cryptographic verification mechanisms (software-based security) with hardware-based TEE attestation. This substitution leverages the inherent security properties of trusted hardware to provide malicious adversary resistance, eliminating the need for computationally intensive zero-knowledge proofs and other heavy cryptographic protocols.
2Reliability
If TEE attestation is integrated into MPC protocols, then security under malicious adversary model is improved, but device complexity and communication overhead increase
Solution Approach 1:
The TEE performs self-attestation by automatically generating and verifying attestation tokens internally within the trusted execution environment. This self-service mechanism eliminates the need for external verification infrastructure, reducing protocol complexity while maintaining security guarantees against malicious adversaries.
3Reliability
If traditional MPC protocols are used without TEE, then communication costs are lower, but susceptibility to malicious deviations increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary attestation verification at the beginning of MPC protocol execution by checking TEE attestation tokens before parties engage in computation. This preliminary action ensures that only properly initialized and authenticated parties participate, preventing malicious deviations without requiring continuous heavy communication during the protocol execution.
Data Source
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AI summary
Disclosed herein are systems, methods, and computer-readable media for enabling more secure multi-party computations (MPCs) using a trusted execution environment (TEE). In one aspect, a method includes executing, by a first MPC computer, a secure MPC protocol in a first TEE of the first MPC computer. The first MPC computer generates a request to a second MPC computer executing the secure MPC protocol in a second TEE of the second MPC computer. The first TEE determines that one or more attestation conditions are met by the first MPC computer executing the secure MPC protocol in the first TEE. In response to determining that the one or more attestation conditions are met, the first TEE generates an attestation token including one or more digital signatures for the secure MPC protocol executing in the first TEE. The first MPC computer sends the attestation token with the request to the second MPC computer.