Telemetry Probe Integrity Using Formal Verification and Append-Only Logs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current telemetry systems on computer platforms rely on implicit trust in the underlying operating environment, making them vulnerable to sophisticated cyberattacks and unable to provide unforgeable telemetry data, leading to inaccurate monitoring and increased operational complexity.
Innovation Solution
A system that uses mathematical modeling and theorem proving to ensure telemetry probe execution flow integrity, implants immutable probes on secure kernels and regular programs, and stores data in secure, append-only logs, while mapping data to cybersecurity regulatory controls.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If telemetry systems rely on implicit trust in the operating environment, then device complexity is reduced and ease of operation is improved, but reliability deteriorates due to vulnerability to cyberattacks and inability to provide unforgeable telemetry data
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by implanting immutable telemetry probes into program code paths before execution. These probes are embedded during system setup or program compilation, establishing trusted monitoring points in advance. The probes are placed in secure-kernel programs and regular programs at predetermined locations where they will automatically execute and collect telemetry data without requiring runtime trust decisions, thus ensuring reliability before the system operates.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces the mechanical/trust-based system with a mathematical model-based system. Instead of relying on implicit trust in the operating environment, the system uses formal mathematical models to represent the computer platform, programs, and their interactions. These models provide provable security guarantees about telemetry probe execution and data integrity, substituting mathematical proof for mechanical trust assumptions.
2Reliability
If immutable telemetry probes are implanted in code paths, then reliability of telemetry data is improved, but device complexity increases due to mathematical modeling and theorem proving requirements
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the complex mathematical modeling and theorem proving activities from the runtime system into a separate development and verification phase. The mathematical models are created and verified independently during system design, and once proven correct, they guide the implantation of telemetry probes. This extraction allows the runtime system to operate with simpler mechanisms while maintaining the reliability guarantees established during the modeling phase.
Solution Approach 2:
The mathematical modeling and theorem proving are performed as preliminary actions before deploying the telemetry system. By completing the complex mathematical verification in advance, the patent establishes a foundation of proven security properties that simplify subsequent implementation. The models are created, verified for correctness, and then used to generate configuration information for probe implantation, rather than requiring continuous mathematical verification during operation.
3Reliability
If append-only logs are used to store telemetry data, then reliability and unforgeability are improved, but device complexity increases due to secure storage and mapping mechanisms
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the telemetry data storage system into distinct components: immutable probes that collect data, append-only logs that store data, and mapping mechanisms that associate data with regulatory controls. Each component has a specific, simplified function. The probes only collect, the logs only store in append-only fashion, and the mapping system only associates metadata. This segmentation allows each part to be implemented with minimal complexity while collectively providing unforgeable telemetry.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces intermediary mechanisms such as the mapping system that connects telemetry data to cybersecurity regulatory controls, and the secure-kernel programs that mediate between regular programs and the append-only log storage. These intermediaries provide the necessary security and compliance functions without requiring the core storage mechanism to be complex. The append-only log itself remains a simple data structure, while the intermediaries handle the complexity of security and compliance requirements.
Data Source
AI summary
System and methods are disclosed for providing unforgeable telemetry on computer platforms. Mathematical modeling and theorem proving are utilized to guarantee the integrity of telemetry probe execution flow and trigger, thereby preventing circumvention and tampering of logged probe data. In contrast to current state-of-the-art solutions that rely implicitly on the operating environment, this approach provides a sound and complete assurance of telemetry output. The system enables organizations to map unforgeable telemetry probe data to industry and government cybersecurity regulatory controls, ensuring compliance therewith. This invention addresses the shortcomings of existing solutions, including their vulnerability to sophisticated attacks, operational complexity, and inability to provide unforgeable telemetry data, thereby providing a reliable and accurate monitoring output in the presence of cyberattacks on computer platforms.