Terrain-Assisted GNSS Spoofing Detection for Vehicle Navigation
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Solution Overview
Problem
GNSS spoofing poses a significant risk to vehicle navigation, particularly in aircraft, as it can lead to incorrect position information, potentially causing crashes, and existing detection methods are inadequate.
Innovation Solution
A method involving independent sensors like VOR, DME, radar, and lidar to verify GNSS position solutions by comparing measured bearings and ranges to expected values, using residual distance analysis and error estimation to detect spoofing through an analytical algorithm.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If GNSS signals are used for navigation, then position determination speed and accuracy are improved, but the system becomes vulnerable to spoofing attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces terrain features as an intermediary reference system to verify GNSS position data. By comparing independently determined terrain bearings and ranges with expected values from the GNSS position, the system detects spoofing without directly modifying the GNSS signal path. This intermediary verification layer resolves the contradiction by maintaining GNSS accuracy while adding reliability through external validation.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements feedback by continuously monitoring residual errors between measured terrain parameters and expected parameters. When residual distances exceed thresholds, the system generates spoofing alerts. This closed-loop feedback mechanism maintains position determination accuracy while ensuring signal integrity through ongoing verification and corrective alerting.
2Measurement precision
If independent sensors (VOR, DME, radar, lidar) are added to verify GNSS position, then detection capability is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies partial action by using a subset of available sensors (bearing and range measurements from VOR, DME, radar, or lidar) rather than requiring all sensors simultaneously. The system can function with bearing-only or range-only measurements, reducing complexity while maintaining detection capability. This selective use of sensors resolves the contradiction by providing sufficient detection accuracy without mandating complete sensor suites.
3Reliability
If bearing and range measurements are compared with expected values, then spoofing detection reliability is improved, but computational requirements increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent extracts the essential verification elements (bearing and range measurements) from the complex sensor data and compares only these extracted parameters with expected values. By focusing computation on the critical residual distance calculations rather than processing all raw sensor data, the system achieves high detection reliability while minimizing computational power requirements.
Data Source
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AI summary
Improvements in Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) spoofing detection of a vehicle are disclosed utilizing bearing and/or range measurements acquired independently from GNSS technology. Bearing and/or range measurements are determined from a GNSS-calculated position. Additionally, bearing and/or range measurements are acquired from an independent sensor, such as a Radio Detection and Ranging (radar) and a terrain database. The differences between the GNSS-based bearing and/or range and the bearing and/or range determined from the independent sensor, along with any applicable sources of error or uncertainty (including the post-hoc residuals from the GNSS-calculated position), are input into an analytical algorithm (e.g., RAIM) to determine whether GNSS spoofing is present with respect to the calculated GNSS position. If spoofing is detected, an alternative position determining system can be used in lieu of GNSS technology, and alerts can be sent notifying appropriate entities of the spoofing result.