Threat Model Chaining for Enterprise Attack Simulation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Traditional threat modeling methodologies are inadequate for assessing organizational risk, as they focus on individual applications, require security experts, are resource-intensive, and cannot scale to meet the needs of enterprises with multiple software applications, nor can they effectively model application interactions, third-party elements, or communicate risks to non-experts.
Innovation Solution
The threat model chaining method involves storing and associating threat model components, threats, and compensating controls in a database, displaying them in a relational diagram, and allowing users to visualize attack paths and toggle compensating controls to mitigate threats, enabling a comprehensive threat modeling process that can be understood by non-security experts.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Productivity
If traditional threat modeling methodologies are used to analyze individual applications, then security analysis can be performed, but the methodology cannot scale to meet the needs of enterprises with multiple software applications
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the threat modeling process into reusable components including data flow diagrams, threat models, and compensating controls that can be independently developed and then assembled to analyze entire enterprise systems. This allows individual application analysis to be broken into modular units that scale across multiple applications.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent creates universal threat modeling components and templates that can be applied across different applications and enterprise contexts. These reusable elements enable the same methodology to serve both individual application analysis and enterprise-wide security assessment, achieving scalability without sacrificing analytical depth.
2Reliability
If traditional threat modeling methodologies are used, then security analysis can be performed, but they require security subject-matter experts for creation, use, and maintenance
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements automated threat model generation and analysis features that reduce dependence on security experts. The system can automatically create threat models from data flow diagrams, identify vulnerabilities, and suggest compensating controls, enabling non-experts to perform reliable security analysis with minimal expert intervention.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces structured templates, standardized components, and guided workflows as intermediaries between security experts and non-expert users. These tools encapsulate expert knowledge in reusable formats that guide non-experts through the threat modeling process, maintaining analysis reliability while improving ease of operation.
3Measurement precision
If traditional threat modeling methodologies are used, then individual application vulnerabilities can be identified, but they cannot effectively model application interactions or third-party elements
Solution Approach 1:
The patent employs nested threat models where individual application threat models are contained within broader enterprise-wide threat models. This hierarchical structure allows precise analysis of individual applications while simultaneously capturing interactions between applications and third-party elements, as each nested level contributes to the overall system understanding.
4Reliability
If traditional threat modeling methodologies are used, then security analysis can be performed, but they are resource-intensive to build and maintain
Solution Approach 1:
The patent emphasizes creating threat models and compensating controls during the early stages of software development, before full implementation and deployment. This preliminary action allows security analysis to be performed when changes are easier and less costly, reducing the resources needed for later maintenance while maintaining high security assessment quality.
Data Source
AI summary
Attack simulation systems include a computing device coupled with a database, the device displaying input interfaces configured to store a plurality of threat model components, threats, and compensating controls in the database, and associate each stored threat with at least one stored component and associate each stored control with at least one of the stored threats through the database. A diagram interface is configured to diagram a system, application, or process, the diagram including some of the stored components and controls, to define a first threat model, and is further configured to display attack paths of all stored threats associated with the diagrammed components which compromise a selected component. Attack simulation methods include defining threat models and displaying attack paths using system interfaces. Threat model chaining methods include adding a component group to a first threat model to include therein a second threat model associated with a predefined component group.