Threat Detection Risk Scoring With False Positive Counterweights

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing threat detection systems generate excessive false positive alerts, wasting resources and exposing networks to potential threats by relying on whitelists that can be compromised, and do not effectively adjust risk scores for reliable objects.

Innovation Solution

Implement a counterweight algorithm that downscales risk scores for objects based on prior false positive alerts, using static or dynamic counterweights to reduce false positives and monitor all objects, rather than relying solely on whitelists.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If threat detection systems use whitelists to stop monitoring trustworthy objects, then false positive alerts are reduced, but security is compromised when whitelist objects are breached

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvereduction of false positive alertsVSAvoidsecurity vulnerability to whitelist compromise
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a counterweight mechanism that applies negative weight to objects that trigger false positive alerts, downsampling their risk scores. This counterweights the harmful effect of false positives by reducing the risk score contribution from reliable objects, while maintaining monitoring without requiring whitelist exclusions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #8Anti-weight (Counterweight)

2Object-affected harmful factors

If threat detection systems monitor all objects continuously, then security is maintained, but computing resources are wasted on false positive alerts from reliable objects

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity monitoring coverageVSAvoidcomputing resource consumption
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSLoss of energy

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements dynamic risk score downsampling where the counterweight applied to an object varies based on its historical false positive rate. Objects with higher false positive rates receive greater downsampling, dynamically adjusting monitoring intensity to conserve resources while maintaining security for truly suspicious objects.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The system changes the risk score parameter for objects based on their reliability history. By modifying the risk score calculation to include counterweight factors, the system adjusts the effective monitoring threshold dynamically without changing the fundamental monitoring architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #35Parameter changes

3Measurement precision

If threat detection systems apply high risk scores to suspicious objects, then threat detection accuracy is improved, but false positive alerts increase for reliable objects

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvethreat detection accuracyVSAvoidfalse positive alert rate
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a feedback loop where objects that trigger false positive alerts are identified and have their counterweights adjusted in subsequent evaluations. This feedback mechanism allows the system to learn from false positives and adjust risk scoring to reduce future false alerts while maintaining detection accuracy for genuine threats.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

Data Source

PatentUS20260099596A1Threat detection and mitigation in a networked environment
Publication Date: 2026.04.09 THE TORONTO DOMINION BANK
  • US20260099596A1 patent drawing
  • US20260099596A1 patent drawing
  • US20260099596A1 patent drawing

AI summary

One example method includes determining, by a threat detection system and at a first time interval, for an object and based on a first risk score computed for the object, that the object poses a threat to the networked environment. Actual threat data indicating that the object does not pose an actual threat can be received. In response to receiving the actual threat data, a value of a first counter can be computed based on prior incorrect identification of the object as a threat. A counterweight can be identified based on the value of the first counter. A second risk score for the object can be downscaled, using the identified counterweight and at a second time interval, to obtain an updated risk score for the object. Access of the object to system resources can be controlled based on whether the updated risk score satisfies a predetermined risk threshold value.