Threshold Key Authentication for Theft-Resistant Electronic Devices
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Solution Overview
Problem
Electronic devices, particularly those in the field, are vulnerable to theft, and existing authentication methods do not effectively prevent stolen devices from being used, posing a risk of unauthorized access and operation.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a threshold cryptography scheme using two partial secret keys, where one key is stored in volatile memory and the other in non-volatile memory, requiring both keys for authentication and operation, and employing a key server to manage and update these keys to prevent unauthorized use after theft.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If a single secret key is stored in the electronic device for authentication, then the device can operate independently and quickly, but the device becomes vulnerable to theft and unauthorized use
Solution Approach 1:
The secret key is divided into multiple partial secret keys (first partial secret key and second partial secret key) that are distributed differently - one stored in volatile memory and another in non-volatile memory. This segmentation ensures that no single location holds the complete key, making theft prevention effective while maintaining operational capability through the threshold cryptography scheme.
2Reliability
If multiple partial secret keys are stored in different memory types for threshold cryptography, then theft prevention is improved, but the device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The electronic device automatically manages the threshold cryptography scheme by retrieving the first partial secret key from volatile memory and the second partial secret key from non-volatile memory without external intervention. The device autonomously combines these partial keys to perform authentication and cryptographic operations, reducing the need for complex external key management systems.
3Reliability
If the first partial secret key is stored only in volatile memory and the second in non-volatile memory, then key security is improved through loss of data on theft, but the device requires more complex key retrieval and combination operations
Solution Approach 1:
The system is designed so that if the electronic device is stolen, the first partial secret key in volatile memory is automatically lost when the device is powered off or reset. This preliminary anti-action prevents unauthorized use without requiring active detection or response mechanisms, as the key destruction happens automatically through normal operational behavior.
4Reliability
If threshold cryptography requires at least two partial secret keys for authentication, then unauthorized access to stolen devices is prevented, but the authentication process becomes more complex and time-consuming
Solution Approach 1:
The electronic device pre-loads the first partial secret key into volatile memory during initialization before authentication is needed. This preliminary action ensures that when authentication is required, the device already has one of the two partial keys ready, reducing the time needed to retrieve and combine keys during the actual authentication process.
Data Source
AI summary
It is provided a method for performing an action by an electronic device (2), based on a first partial secret key (10a) and a corresponding second partial secret key (10b), wherein the first partial secret key (10a) and the second partial secret key (10b) form part of a threshold cryptography scheme (11) associated with a public key (12). The method comprises: transmitting (40), upon the device initialising, a request for a first partial secret key (10a) to a key server (3); receiving (42) the first partial secret key (10a) from the key server (3); storing (44) the first partial secret key (10a) only in volatile memory (70); retrieving (46) a second partial secret key (10b) from non-volatile memory (71); and performing (48) an action based on applying both the first partial secret key (10a) and the second partial secret key (10b).