TLS PSK Identity Derivation for Scalable NVMe/TCP Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols for NVMe/TCP face challenges in managing a large number of pre-shared keys (PSKs) due to the O(n^2) complexity, requiring multiple PSKs for each pair of entities, which complicates secure channel setup and management.
Innovation Solution
Implement TLS concatenation using an ephemeral shared session key derived from a Diffie-Hellman hash-based message authentication code (DH-HMAC) Challenge-Handshake Authentication Protocol (CHAP), reducing the need for per-entity PSKs to a per-entity DH-HMAC-CHAP secret provisioning, thus managing O(n) secrets.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If TLS concatenation is implemented without unique PSK identity derivation, then secure channel establishment is simplified, but security is compromised due to meddler-in-the-middle attacks and command injection vulnerabilities
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the PSK identity derivation process into distinct components: a PSK digest generated from authentication exchange data, and a unique identifier component. This segmentation allows the system to maintain simplified TLS concatenation operations while incorporating security-critical unique identification, preventing meddler-in-the-middle attacks by ensuring each PSK instance has a distinct identity that cannot be confused with others.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent performs preliminary action by deriving the PSK digest and unique PSK identity before the TLS negotiation begins. This advance preparation ensures that unique, security-critical identifiers are established prior to secure channel formation, preventing command injection attacks while maintaining the efficiency of the TLS concatenation process without requiring complex runtime identity verification.
2Ease of manufacture
If PSK management follows traditional methods, then implementation is straightforward, but security vulnerabilities arise from inability to detect command injection attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a PSK digest as an intermediary element between the authentication exchange and the TLS PSK negotiation. This digest, derived from authentication data including host and controller identities, serves as a security mediator that verifies the legitimacy of PSK usage. The intermediary mechanism maintains implementation simplicity by integrating seamlessly into existing TLS flows while providing the detection capability needed to prevent command injection attacks.
3Reliability
If unique PSK identity is derived using PSK digest, then security against meddler-in-the-middle attacks is improved, but computational overhead increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent changes the parameter of PSK identity from a simple identifier to a derived value (PSK digest) based on authentication exchange data. This parameter transformation provides strong security against meddler-in-the-middle attacks because the digest uniquely reflects the authentication context. The computational overhead is minimized by using efficient hash functions and by performing the derivation once during authentication setup rather than repeatedly during TLS negotiations.
Data Source
AI summary
Systems and methods for determining a pre-shared key (PSK) identity for Transport Layer Security (TLS) are described. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an Information Handling System (IHS) may include: a processor; and a memory coupled to the processor, wherein the memory comprises program instructions store thereon that, upon execution by the processor, cause the IHS to: establish a Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) connection with a another IHS; generate a TLS PSK; derive based, at least in part, on the TLS PSK, a unique PSK identity associated with the TLS PSK; and perform a TLS negotiation with the other IHS using the TLS PSK and the unique PSK identity.