TLS Endpoint TEE Attestation Verification

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocols do not adequately verify domain ownership and the attestation of trusted execution environments (TEEs), which are crucial for ensuring the security of data exchanged in multi-tenanted computing environments like cloud computing systems.

Innovation Solution

The proposed solution extends the TLS handshake protocol to include verification of domain ownership using TLS certificates and attestation of TEEs. This involves generating and verifying TEE certificates within the TLS handshake, ensuring that data is processed within a trusted environment.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If TLS protocol is extended to include TEE attestation verification, then security of data exchange is improved, but protocol complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvesecurity of data exchangeVSAvoidprotocol complexity

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The TLS handshake protocol is segmented into distinct phases, with TEE attestation verification implemented as a separate extension module. The CertificateVerify message is divided into traditional signature verification and new TEE attestation components, allowing independent implementation and maintenance of each function while reducing overall protocol complexity.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

A TEE attestation certificate acts as an intermediary credential that bridges the gap between traditional TLS authentication and TEE verification. This intermediate certificate structure allows the protocol to verify TEE status without requiring fundamental changes to the existing TLS framework, thus improving security while managing complexity.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If TEE attestation is verified during TLS handshake, then trust in execution environment is improved, but authentication time increases

Engineering Contradiction:

Improvetrust in execution environmentVSAvoidauthentication time

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

TEE attestation certificates are generated and prepared in advance during the TEE initialization phase, before the actual TLS handshake begins. This preliminary preparation ensures that when the handshake occurs, the attestation data is already available for immediate verification, reducing authentication time while maintaining trust verification.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent replaces complex multi-step TEE verification mechanisms with a simplified certificate-based verification system. Instead of performing extensive runtime checks of the execution environment, the system uses pre-issued TEE attestation certificates that can be verified through standard cryptographic operations, significantly reducing verification time.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #28Mechanics substitution (Replace mechanical system)

Data Source

PatentUS12212601B2Transport layer security computer devices and methods

Publication Date: 2025.01.28 MICROSOFT TECHNOLOGY LICENSING LLC

AI summary

A computer device instantiates a first Transport Layer Security (TLS) endpoint having access to a trusted execution environment (TEE) of the processor; generates in the TEE in an endpoint-specific public-private key pair bound to the first TLS endpoint; generates of attestation data verifying that the endpoint-specific public-private key pair was generated in the TEE and is bound to the first TLS endpoint; and signs the attestation data in the TEE using a TEE private key securely embedded in the processor. The device generates a TEE signature using an endpoint-specific private key of an endpoint-specific public-private key pair; and indicates of the attestation data, an endpoint-specific public key of the endpoint-specific public public-private key pair and the TEE signature to a second TLS endpoint within a TLS handshake message exchange between the first TLS endpoint and the second TLS endpoint.