Centralized Volume Encryption Key Management for Edge Devices with TPMs
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Solution Overview
Problem
Ensuring the security and reliability of edge devices in IoT networks, particularly those in remote or unattended locations, is challenging due to the difficulty in physically inspecting these devices and the unreliability of remote diagnostics if they are compromised, necessitating secure storage volume management.
Innovation Solution
Implementing centralized volume encryption key management using Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs) to securely manage encryption keys for edge devices, ensuring that only authorized states can access and unseal the encryption keys, thereby protecting the storage volumes from unauthorized access.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If centralized volume encryption key management using TPMs is implemented, then security and reliability of edge devices is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
A Trusted Platform Module (TPM) is introduced as an intermediary hardware component that securely manages encryption keys. The TPM acts as a mediator between the edge device and the centralized key management system, providing secure key storage, key generation, and cryptographic operations without requiring complex software-based security implementations on the edge device itself.
Solution Approach 2:
Encryption keys are generated and stored in the TPM during device manufacturing or initial provisioning, before the device is deployed to remote locations. The TPM pre-configures security credentials and establishes trusted boot chains, ensuring that security is built-in from the outset rather than requiring complex post-deployment security management.
2Reliability
If physical inspection of edge devices is performed, then security verification is improved, but ease of operation deteriorates due to limited access
Solution Approach 1:
Physical inspection mechanisms are replaced with cryptographic verification mechanisms. Instead of requiring physical access to inspect devices, the system uses TPM-based attestation where the TPM provides cryptographic proofs of device integrity, software state, and security credentials through remote attestation protocols, enabling security verification without physical presence.
Solution Approach 2:
The TPM serves as an intermediary that provides remote attestation capabilities, allowing the centralized management system to verify device security status without physical inspection. The TPM mediates between the device's internal state and external verification, providing cryptographic evidence of device integrity through secure channels.
3Productivity
If remote diagnostics are implemented on compromised devices, then diagnostic capability is maintained, but reliability of diagnostics deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements continuous feedback through remote attestation where the TPM periodically provides cryptographic verification of device state to the centralized management system. This feedback mechanism detects compromises by verifying that the device's software and configuration match expected trusted states, allowing the system to identify and respond to compromised devices before they can reliably report diagnostic information.
Solution Approach 2:
The TPM establishes trusted measurement registers during device boot that record the state of critical software and hardware components before execution. These preliminary measurements provide a baseline for detecting compromises, ensuring that diagnostic information can only be trusted if it originates from a device that has passed TPM-based integrity verification.
Data Source
AI summary
The present disclosure relates to centralized volume encryption key management for edge devices with trusted platform modules (TPM)s. In some aspects a volume encryption key is generated for a gateway device. A sealing authorization policy is also generated for the gateway device. The sealing authorization policy is generated based on a predetermined platform configuration register (PCR) mask and expected PCR values. The volume encryption key and the sealing authorization policy are transmitted from the management service to the gateway device to provision the gateway device with the volume encryption key.