Traceable Transaction Trees for Duplicate-Proof Certification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing sustainability tracking solutions in supply chains fail to prevent duplicate certifications and cannot guarantee that certified amounts and capacities are not exceeded, leaving trust gaps that can be exploited by malicious actors.
Innovation Solution
A computer-implemented method that involves accessing and de-obfuscating transactions using respective secrets, cryptographically signing them, and recording them in a blockchain to form a traceable tree of transactions, ensuring compliance with a predetermined model.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional track-and-trace systems are used for sustainability tracking, then basic transaction recording is possible, but duplicate certifications cannot be prevented and trust gaps remain
Solution Approach 1:
A certifier entity is introduced as an intermediary between producers and consumers. The certifier receives secrets from producers, verifies transactions, and issues cryptographic signatures that serve as trusted certification. This intermediary prevents duplicate certifications by controlling the signature issuance process and ensuring only valid transactions are certified.
Solution Approach 2:
Traditional mechanical tracking systems are replaced with a cryptographic system based on digital signatures and hash functions. Transactions are transformed into cryptographic artifacts (signatures) that can be verified without revealing underlying transaction details. This substitution enables reliable certification tracking while maintaining system efficiency.
2Loss of information
If all transaction details are made transparent for verification, then complete traceability is achieved, but privacy of transaction participants is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The essential verification information (transaction hashes, signatures, certifier identifiers) is extracted from the full transaction details and placed on the blockchain. The complete transaction data remains private between participants. This extraction enables verification of certification authenticity without exposing sensitive transaction information.
Solution Approach 2:
Instead of storing or transmitting full transaction details, cryptographic copies (hashes and signatures) are created and stored on the blockchain. These copies serve as verifiable proof of transaction existence and certification without revealing the actual transaction content, thus protecting participant privacy while maintaining traceability.
3Reliability
If cryptographic signatures are required for each transaction to prevent duplication, then certification security is improved, but transaction processing complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The certification process is merged with the transaction verification process. The certifier performs both functions simultaneously by verifying transaction validity and issuing cryptographic signatures in a single step. This merging reduces overall system complexity compared to separate verification and certification processes.
Solution Approach 2:
Each participant in the supply chain independently generates and manages their own cryptographic keys and signs their own transactions. This self-service approach eliminates the need for a centralized authority to manage all signatures, reducing system complexity while maintaining security through distributed cryptographic verification.
Data Source
AI summary
A disclosed technique enables a tree of transactions between entities which may be a first entity and a second entity. The technique may be implemented at a transaction recipient, which can be one of the entities or an external actor, such as a certifier. The transaction recipient accesses two transactions, including a first and second transaction, and two respective secrets, including a first and second secret. The first transaction originates from the first entity, while the second transaction originates from the second entity. The first and second transaction are obfuscated based on the first secret and the second secret, respectively. The first transaction is logically connected to the second transaction. The transaction recipient further de-obfuscates the two transactions using the two respective secrets, and cryptographically signs at least a part of the second transaction to obtain a signature, prior to allowing the second entity to access the obtained signature.