Trap Event Registration with ACL Permission Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
The existing Trap Management Object (TrapMO) framework in device management systems faces security weaknesses related to inward and outward traps, particularly in ensuring appropriate authority for command execution and preventing unauthorized information transfer, which can lead to security risks and denial-of-service attacks.
Innovation Solution
A method is introduced that involves receiving a trap register request, checking the server's permission to execute the trap operation using an Access Control List (ACL), registering the trap if permissions are valid, and notifying the executable node only if the server has the necessary authority, ensuring that only authorized servers can execute commands and transfer event information.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If the TrapMO framework allows servers to register and execute trap operations without strict permission checking, then the ease of operation and system responsiveness are improved, but security vulnerabilities arise allowing unauthorized command execution and information transfer
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by checking server permissions against the ACL database before allowing trap registration and execution. The DM client verifies whether the server has appropriate permissions in advance of any trap operation, preventing unauthorized commands from being executed while still allowing legitimate operations to proceed smoothly.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism where the ACL database acts as a mediator between the server and trap execution. The DM client consults the ACL database to verify server permissions, creating a security layer that mediates access control without directly blocking legitimate operations or requiring complex security protocols.
2Object-affected harmful factors
If the system implements strict permission checking for trap operations, then security is improved, but the complexity of the system increases due to additional authorization steps
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies self-service by having the DM client autonomously check server permissions against the ACL database without requiring external security validation. The system serves its own security needs by internally verifying permissions before trap execution, eliminating the need for additional external authorization infrastructure or complex multi-layer security protocols.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent leverages the existing ACL database, which is already used for other device management authorization purposes, and applies it universally to trap operations as well. This multi-functional use of the ACL database provides comprehensive security without requiring separate permission checking mechanisms, thereby avoiding additional system complexity.
3Speed
If the DM client transfers trap event information to servers without verifying current ACL permissions, then the speed of information transfer is improved, but the risk of denial-of-service attacks and unauthorized information access increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by verifying server permissions against the ACL database before transferring trap event information. The DM client checks whether the server has appropriate permissions in advance of information transfer, ensuring that only authorized servers receive event data while maintaining efficient transfer speeds for legitimate operations.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements feedback by having the DM client continuously verify server permissions before each trap event notification. This feedback mechanism ensures that servers remain authorized to receive information and prevents unauthorized access or denial-of-service attacks while maintaining efficient information flow for legitimate servers.
Data Source
Figure 1~2a
Figure 2b~3
Figure 4a
AI summary
The present invention relates to a method of compensating for a security weakness related to an inward trap and an outward trap. To this end, a method according to a first embodiment disclosed in the present specification, for controlling a trap operation of an end device for notifying a trap to other functional components, comprises the steps of: receiving a trap register request from a server, wherein the trap register request includes a trap identifier, a server identifier and a target identifier; checking whether the server has a permission to execute an executable node indicated by the target identifier associated with the trap identifier; registering a trap by storing the server identifier to be associated with the trap identifier if the server has the permission to execute the executable node, wherein the trap includes a trap event and is associated with the trap identifier; detecting the trap event; checking whether a server identified by the stored server identifier has the permission to execute the executable node; and notifying the executable node of the trap event if the server identified by the stored server identifier has the permission to execute the executable node.