Trust Architecture for 5G Network Slice Security
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Traditional 5G network security provisions fail to adequately address the unique security needs of each network slice, leading to potential disruptions and data breaches, as they rely on a 'trust-but-verify' philosophy and do not effectively enforce isolation between slices, especially with the growing use of specialized device networks and enterprise networks.
Innovation Solution
A trust architecture is implemented that distributes network security functionality to individual entities within the network slice, using policy enforcement points (PEPs) and policy decision points (PDPs) to enforce access control and validate authenticity, ensuring only authorized entities access resources, with PEPs evaluating incoming requests and PDPs making access control decisions based on predefined policies.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional network security provisions are used with a trust-but-verify philosophy, then network operation simplicity is maintained, but security isolation between network slices is insufficient leading to potential disruptions and data breaches
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments network security functionality by introducing slice-specific security domains and protection points at each network function within a slice. This creates isolated security contexts for each network slice, ensuring that security policies and credentials are enforced independently per slice rather than using a unified trust-but-verify approach across the entire network.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements local quality by assigning unique security credentials and policies to each network slice and its constituent network functions. Each slice operates with its own security context, allowing tailored security measures for specific slices while maintaining overall network operation. This enables differentiated security treatment for different slices based on their specific requirements.
2Speed
If centralized security management is used, then policy consistency is maintained, but responsiveness to slice-specific security threats is slowed
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides security management into slice-specific security domains, each with its own protection points and policy enforcement mechanisms. This segmentation allows each slice to independently evaluate and respond to security threats without waiting for centralized decision-making, thereby improving response speed while maintaining policy consistency through standardized domain architectures.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent enables network functions within each slice to autonomously evaluate security credentials and enforce policies using slice-specific credentials stored in secure elements. This self-service capability allows immediate local security decisions without external intervention, accelerating threat response while the standardized domain structure ensures policies remain consistent across slices.
3Reliability
If network functions share common credentials, then authentication simplicity is maintained, but unauthorized access between slices becomes possible
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments credential management by issuing unique security credentials to each network slice and its constituent network functions. These slice-specific credentials are stored in secure elements within each network function, creating distinct authentication contexts that prevent credential sharing and unauthorized cross-slice access while maintaining simple authentication procedures within each slice.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements local quality in credential management by associating specific credentials with specific slices and their network functions. Each network function uses its own slice-specific credentials for authentication and authorization, enabling tailored access control policies for each slice while simplifying credential validation through localized security domains.
Data Source
AI summary
In various embodiments, systems and methods for a trust architecture for telecommunication network slice security are disclosed. In some embodiments a trust architecture for telecommunication network slice security distributes network security functionality to individual network entities that constitute elements of a network slice instance. Slice network functions each individually implement components of the trust architecture for the network slice using a policy enforcement point (PEP) and a policy decision point (PDP). Each slice network function thus validates the authenticity and authorized privileges associated with the subject entity seeking a service from that slice network function, and grants or denies such service requests based on a policy implemented by the PEP and PDP.