Trust Domain Key Management via Hardware Isolation

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Solution Overview

Problem

Conventional systems for protecting and managing encryption keys in virtualized systems fail to completely isolate encryption logic from the Virtual Machine Manager (VMM) access space, lacking CPU or protected memory handling for TD security mechanisms, which exposes encryption keys to vulnerabilities.

Innovation Solution

The Trust Domain (TD) architecture employs a memory encryption engine, a Trust Domain Resource Manager (TDRM), and micro-architectural tables to manage encryption keys, isolating the actual encryption mechanism and keys in protected memory accessible by the CPU, allowing the TDRM to perform key management via key identifiers while preventing direct access.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If software applications are allowed to directly manage encryption keys, then key management flexibility and ease of operation are improved, but security and reliability deteriorate due to vulnerabilities in software applications

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvekey management flexibilityVSAvoidencryption key security
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) as an intermediary hardware component between software applications and encryption keys. The TPM handles key generation, storage, and management operations securely in isolated hardware space, while providing standardized interfaces for key operations. This mediator approach allows software to manage keys flexibly through standardized APIs while maintaining security isolation that prevents direct software access to cryptographic operations.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If encryption keys are isolated in protected memory accessible by CPU only, then security and reliability are improved, but device complexity increases due to additional hardware components and memory protection mechanisms

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveencryption key securityVSAvoidhardware architecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent merges the TPM functionality with the CPU architecture by integrating the TPM as a specialized hardware module that operates within the existing processor framework. The TPM shares the CPU's memory address space and uses standard memory protection mechanisms, combining secure key storage with conventional processor operations. This integration approach provides hardware-based security isolation while avoiding the need for entirely separate complex hardware systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #5Merging (Combining)

3Adaptability or versatility

If multiple trust domains are supported with separate encryption keys, then adaptability and versatility are improved, but device complexity increases due to management of multiple keys and domains

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemulti-trust domain supportVSAvoidkey management complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements a universal TPM interface that serves multiple trust domains through a single hardware platform. The TPM maintains separate key stores for different trust domains while providing unified access mechanisms through standardized commands. This multi-functional design allows the same TPM hardware to securely manage encryption keys across multiple isolated domains without requiring separate dedicated hardware for each domain, reducing overall system complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

Data Source

PatentUS12174972B2Secure encryption key management in trust domains
Publication Date: 2024.12.24 INTEL CORP
  • US12174972B2 patent drawing
  • US12174972B2 patent drawing
  • US12174972B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Implementations describe providing secure encryption key management in trust domains. In one implementation, a processing device includes a key ownership table (KOT) that is protected against software access. The processing device further includes a processing core to execute a trust domain resource manager (TDRM) to create a trust domain (TD) and a randomly-generated encryption key corresponding to the TD, the randomly-generated encryption key identified by a guest key identifier (GKID) and protected against software access from at least one of the TDRM or other TDs, the TDRM is to reference the KOT to obtain at least one unassigned host key identifier (HKID) utilized to encrypt a TD memory, the TDRM is to assign the HKID to the TD by marking the HKID in the KOT as assigned, and configure the randomly-generated encryption key on the processing device by associating the randomly-generated encryption key with the HKID.