Wireless Packet Integrity Verification Using Trust Field

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Solution Overview

Problem

In wireless distributed communication systems, verifying the integrity of packets with a small number of bits is challenging, especially when cyclic redundancy checks (CRC) are not feasible due to the limited size of the packet, leading to difficulties in ensuring data reliability.

Innovation Solution

A method and device utilizing a trust field, generated using a pseudo noise (PN) generator and trust bit generator, with a secret key, to check the integrity of packets without CRC, by comparing the generated trust field with the one included in the packet, incorporating current time and slot information, and using on-off keying modulation for error detection.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If a cyclic redundancy check (CRC) is used to verify packet integrity, then reliability of data transmission is improved, but the packet size increases and becomes infeasible for small packets

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvepacket integrity verificationVSAvoidpacket size
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSQuantity of substance

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the integrity verification function from the traditional CRC mechanism and implements it through a trust field that is already present in the packet structure. Instead of adding a separate CRC field, the trust field is generated using a hash function of the packet data itself, thereby verifying integrity without increasing packet size.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Solution Approach 2:

The trust field serves multiple functions: it acts as both an integrity verification mechanism and a security authentication element. By using a hash function that incorporates the packet data and a secret key, the trust field simultaneously verifies data integrity and authenticates the packet source, replacing the need for separate CRC and authentication mechanisms.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

2Reliability

If a trust field changes over time to prevent replication, then security against illegal packet duplication is improved, but the complexity of trust field generation increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity against packet replicationVSAvoidtrust field generation mechanism
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The trust field is designed to be dynamic by incorporating time-varying elements such as slot numbers or sequence numbers into the hash function. This ensures that the trust field value changes with each transmission time slot, preventing illegal replication while maintaining a relatively simple generation mechanism based on standard hash functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a secret key as an intermediary element in the trust field generation process. The hash function combines the packet data, time-varying parameters, and the secret key to generate the trust field. This intermediary mechanism provides security without requiring complex cryptographic algorithms, balancing security requirements with implementation simplicity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Data Source

PatentUS11825311B2Method and device of checking integrity of packet using trust field in wireless distributed communication systems
Publication Date: 2023.11.21 ELECTRONICS & TELECOMM RES INST
  • US11825311B2 patent drawing
  • US11825311B2 patent drawing
  • US11825311B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method of checking the integrity of a wireless distributed communication packet using a trust field in a wireless distributed communication system may comprise: allowing a first terminal to acquire a trust-field-generation-specific secret key of a second terminal; allowing the second terminal to generate a trust field utilizing all bits to be transmitted to the first terminal; allowing the second terminal to generate a first packet using the trust field and all the bits to be transmitted; allowing the second terminal to transmit the first packet to the first terminal; and allowing the first terminal to check the integrity of the first packet using the trust-field-generation-specific secret key and the trust field included in the first packet.