Trust Token Verification for Secure Message Exchange
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional systems are susceptible to relay, replay, and man-in-the-middle (MITM) attacks during electronic transactions, as they lack effective mechanisms to verify the trustworthiness of devices from different trust environments and ensure message integrity.
Innovation Solution
A method involving the generation and use of trust tokens, where a computing device creates a first trust token using digitally signed data from a trust provider and its own digitally signed data, and transmits it to a recipient device, which verifies the token's validity by obtaining an indication from the trust provider, ensuring the message's integrity and trustworthiness.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If conventional message exchange systems are used, then ease of operation is maintained, but security against relay, replay, and MITM attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by generating and validating trust tokens before actual message exchange occurs. The trust token is created in advance using digitally signed data from a trust provider, and its validity is verified before the message is processed, preventing attacks rather than detecting them after the fact.
Solution Approach 2:
A trust provider computer acts as an intermediary that issues digitally signed data to both the computing device and recipient device. This intermediary enables mutual trust verification between devices that would otherwise have no way to establish trust, resolving the contradiction by introducing a trusted third party that simplifies the security model.
2Reliability
If trust tokens are generated and validated, then detection of relay, replay, and MITM attacks is improved, but loss of time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The trust token validity is verified in advance before message processing occurs. By performing the trust verification beforehand, the system avoids time-consuming security checks during actual message exchange, reducing the perceived time loss while maintaining strong attack detection capabilities.
Solution Approach 2:
The computing device performs self-verification of the trust token using the digitally signed data and the trust provider's public key. This self-service approach eliminates the need for continuous server validation, reducing time loss while maintaining reliable attack detection through cryptographic verification.
3Reliability
If tokens are verified by obtaining indication from trust provider, then reliability of message validation is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The trust provider computer serves as an intermediary that simplifies validation by providing pre-signed trust tokens. Instead of implementing complex validation logic, the computing device only needs to verify the digital signature using the trust provider's public key, which is a straightforward cryptographic operation that maintains reliability while minimizing complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The trust provider creates copies of its digitally signed data and distributes them to multiple devices. Each device receives a copy of the trust token that can be independently verified without requiring continuous communication with the trust provider, reducing validation complexity while maintaining high reliability through cryptographic proof.
Data Source
AI summary
Embodiments of the invention are directed to the utilization of trust tokens to perform secure message transactions between two devices. A trust token transmitted in a message from one device may include first data that is digitally signed by a trust provider computer, and second data that is digitally signed by the device itself. Upon receipt of a message containing a trust token, the recipient may utilize the first data to verify with the trust provider computer that the sender of the message is a trusted party. The trust provider computer may provide the recipient device the public key of the sender. The recipient may utilize the second data and the provided public key to verify that the sender signed the message and that the message is unaltered. These techniques may increase detection of relay, replay, or other man-in-the-middle attacks, decreasing the likelihood that such attacks will be successful.