Trusted Application Dynamic Verification Module
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional boot sequences for electronic devices do not verify the integrity, authenticity, and validity of Trusted Applications (TAs) during the boot process, making them vulnerable to attacks that can compromise the device.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a Trusted Application Dynamic Verification Module (TDVM) that verifies registered TAs during the kernel boot sequence by confirming their signatures, rollback prevention versions, and operational correctness through self-verification functions, ensuring the integrity and authenticity of TAs before completing the boot process.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If Secure Boot and Trusted Boot processes are used to verify bootloaders and OS, then the integrity of system software is improved, but individual Trusted Applications (TAs) in the secure world remain unverified and vulnerable to compromise
Solution Approach 1:
The verification process is segmented into multiple stages: Secure Boot verifies bootloader integrity, Trusted Boot verifies OS integrity, and the new TA verification process specifically verifies individual Trusted Applications. This segmentation allows each component to be verified independently, expanding coverage from just system software to include individual TAs in the secure world.
Solution Approach 2:
The TA verification process performs preliminary verification of Trusted Applications during the kernel boot sequence, before the TA is executed. This preliminary action ensures that TAs are validated for integrity, authenticity, and version consistency before they can compromise the system, preventing attacks at the source rather than reacting to them later.
2Device complexity
If versioning inconsistencies and leaks are not verified, then boot process complexity is reduced, but malicious actors can leverage these inconsistencies to compromise electronic devices
Solution Approach 1:
The verification process implements feedback mechanisms that check for versioning inconsistencies and information leaks during the boot sequence. The system verifies that TAs match expected versions and that no sensitive information is leaked during verification. This feedback loop provides continuous security validation without significantly increasing complexity, as the checks are integrated into the existing boot process flow.
3Reliability
If individual Trusted Applications are verified during kernel boot sequence, then security of TAs is improved, but boot process time and complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
TA verification is performed as a preliminary action during the kernel boot sequence, before the TA is executed. By verifying TAs early in the boot process rather than at execution time, the system ensures security without adding significant overhead to TA operations. The verification results are cached and used for subsequent TA executions, reducing repeated verification time.
Solution Approach 2:
The verification process utilizes self-service mechanisms where TAs provide their own verification data (such as version information and integrity proofs) during the verification process. This self-service approach reduces the computational burden on the verifier and speeds up the verification process, minimizing the time added to the boot sequence while maintaining comprehensive security checks.
Data Source
AI summary
An electronic device, a method, and a non-transitory, computer-readable medium storing instructions for dynamically verifying trusted applications (TAs) during a boot sequence. The electronic device includes a memory and a processor operably connected to the memory. The processor executes instructions stored in the memory to cause the electronic device to initialize a kernel boot sequence in response to confirming that executable codes for booting the electronic device are from a trusted binary and then verify one or more registered TAs during the kernel boot sequence. Completion of the kernel boot sequence is based on verification results of the set of registered TAs.