Trusted Boot Verification Using One-Time Programmable FUSE Memory
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current solutions fail to meet the high requirements for security, stability, and credibility in the booting process of portable network devices, particularly in the 5G era, where devices require reliable and secure OS booting without additional management systems.
Innovation Solution
A trusted boot method and apparatus that extracts and compares keys from the IE FUSE and FW to verify the integrity of boot parameters, ensuring that only trusted parameters boot the OS, and includes mechanisms for BIOS boot parameter verification and special boot rules to manage tampering and device replacement.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If security verification is performed for each image file region during booting, then the reliability and security of OS booting is improved, but the device complexity and boot time increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-storing authentication information (first authentication information) in the FUSE during device manufacturing. This authentication information is generated based on initial boot parameters and stored in a one-time programmable manner. During booting, the system only needs to retrieve and verify this pre-stored information against current boot parameters, rather than performing complex verification from scratch. This resolves the contradiction by establishing security verification mechanisms in advance, making the actual boot-time verification simpler and faster while maintaining high security standards.
2Adaptability or versatility
If multiple data writes are supported in IE FW for updates, then the adaptability and upgrade capability are improved, but the risk of parameter tampering increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies segmentation by separating the storage of authentication information from the storage of boot parameters. The first authentication information is stored in the FUSE (one-time programmable memory), while boot parameters are stored in the IE FW (flash memory with multiple write support). This segmentation allows the FW to be updated multiple times for adaptability while the FUSE maintains a immutable reference for security verification. The verification process compares current boot parameters against the pre-stored authentication information, ensuring integrity even as the FW undergoes multiple updates.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses the FUSE as an intermediary between the immutable security requirements and the mutable firmware update requirements. The FUSE stores authentication information that acts as a mediator - it is written once during manufacturing and cannot be changed, yet it verifies the integrity of boot parameters that do change during firmware updates. This intermediary structure allows the system to support multiple FW writes for upgrades while maintaining parameter integrity through cryptographic verification against the stable FUSE-stored authentication data.
3Measurement precision
If key comparison verification is performed for boot parameters, then the detection precision of tampering is improved, but the boot time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent replaces complex mechanical or computational verification mechanisms with cryptographic hash-based verification. Instead of comparing entire boot parameter sets or performing complex integrity checks, the system uses cryptographic hash functions to generate compact authentication values from boot parameters and compares these small fixed-size outputs against pre-stored authentication information in the FUSE. This substitution maintains high detection precision for tampering while dramatically reducing the computational time and resources required during booting, as hash comparison is much faster than full parameter verification.
Data Source
AI summary
A trusted boot method and apparatus, an electronic device, and a readable memory medium. In the method, an IE FUSE that supports only one data write and an IE FW that supports multiple data writes are designed, whereby a first key written in the IE FUSE is prevented from being tampered with. If a second key generated based on a first signature extracted from the current IE FW is different from the first key, it indicates that IE boot parameters stored in the current IE FW are already different from those initially stored in the IE FW, that is, the parameters have been tampered with. In most cases, the IE boot parameters stored in the IE FW should not be tampered with. Therefore, once tampering is discovered, there are reasons to believe that there is a security risk of malicious attacks.