Trusted Chain Construction Using Dual Secure Execution Environments
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Solution Overview
Problem
The trusted measurement agent in trusted computing nodes is vulnerable to attacks, compromising the credibility of the TPCM, as it is part of the operating system and lacks robust security.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a dual secure and trusted execution environment with separate security certificates to perform mutual signature authentication on measurement requests and data, ensuring the TPCM's credibility by excluding the trusted measurement agent from the TCB and relying on hardware-based secure enclaves for data processing.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If the trusted measurement agent runs in the operating system as software, then it can perform measurement functions flexibly, but its security is poor and it is easy to be attacked
Solution Approach 1:
The system divides the trusted measurement functionality into separate secure execution environments (first and second secure execution environments) that are isolated from the operating system. This segmentation allows the measurement agent to maintain flexibility while being protected in a dedicated secure context, resolving the contradiction between software flexibility and security.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism using secure execution environments and cryptographic certificates. The measurement agent communicates through authenticated interfaces with the TPCM and other components, acting as a protected intermediary rather than a vulnerable software component directly in the OS, thereby improving security while maintaining functional adaptability.
2Productivity
If the trusted measurement agent is attacked, then measurement functions can still operate, but the credibility of the TPCM is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements prior cushioning by establishing multiple secure execution environments with cryptographic verification before any measurement operations. The TPCM verifies credentials and signatures in advance, creating a protective buffer that prevents attacks on the measurement agent from compromising TPCM credibility, while allowing measurement functions to continue operating under verified conditions.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies local quality by creating distinct secure execution environments with different security characteristics for different functions. The first secure environment handles TPCM communication with enhanced verification, while the second handles measurement operations, allowing each to maintain appropriate credibility levels independently.
3Reliability
If dual secure execution environments with signature authentication are implemented, then TPCM credibility is improved, but device complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements universality by designing the secure execution environments to handle multiple functions: credential verification, measurement operations, data authentication, and inter-component communication. This multi-functionality reduces the need for separate specialized components, thereby limiting the increase in device complexity while maintaining high TPCM credibility through comprehensive signature authentication.
Data Source
AI summary
Embodiments of this specification disclose computing devices and methods for constructing a trusted chain of a computing device, and relate to the field of information security technologies. The method includes following: A trusted module located on the computing device is started; the trusted module measures a CRTM of a processor on the computing device, and stores a measurement result in the trusted module; and when the CRTM is executed by the processor, a next level of code of the CRTM is measured, and a measurement result is stored in the trusted module; and when the next level of code of the CRTM is executed by the processor, a next level of code is measured, and a measurement result is stored in the trusted module, where by analogy, next levels of code is measured layer by layer to complete trusted chain establishment for the computing device.