Trusted Component Mediator for Guest Instance Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

In shared computing environments, such as cloud computing systems, the hypervisor has access to both applications and data, posing security risks as malicious operators can clone guest instances for cryptographic attacks, and existing controls are insufficient to prevent unauthorized instantiation of virtual servers.

Innovation Solution

A method where a trusted component, acting as a mediator between the client and the hypervisor, encrypts requests to run a guest image with a unique identifier and communication key, generates an authorization request to an authorizing entity, and controls the number of instances to prevent unauthorized cloning and attacks, ensuring only authorized instances are initiated.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of operation

If the hypervisor manages virtual machines directly, then the system operation is simple and efficient, but the hypervisor gains access to applications and data which creates security risks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvehypervisor management simplicityVSAvoidsecurity risk from hypervisor access
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a trusted component as an intermediary between the hypervisor and guest instances. This trusted component manages the guest instances on behalf of the hypervisor, preventing the hypervisor from directly accessing applications and data while maintaining operational efficiency. The trusted component acts as a mediator that enforces security policies without complicating the hypervisor's management functions.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Adaptability or versatility

If the hypervisor can clone guest instances freely, then the system is flexible and adaptable, but malicious operators can clone instances for cryptographic attacks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveinstance cloning flexibilityVSAvoidmalicious cloning for attacks
Core Design Contradiction:
Adaptability or versatilityVSObject-generated harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements preliminary authorization checks before allowing guest instance cloning. The trusted component verifies authorization tokens and validates cloning requests against security policies before permitting instance creation. This preliminary validation prevents malicious cloning operations while maintaining legitimate flexibility for authorized users to clone instances when needed.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

3Object-affected harmful factors

If encryption is implemented to protect guest data, then data security is improved, but the system complexity increases

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedata protection from accessVSAvoidsystem architecture complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Object-affected harmful factorsVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the encryption and decryption functions from the main system flow and concentrates them in the trusted component. By isolating cryptographic operations to a dedicated security module, the patent protects guest data effectively while containing the complexity within a specific component rather than distributing it throughout the entire system architecture.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS10237245B2Restricting guest instances in a shared environment
Publication Date: 2019.03.19 INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS MACHINE CORPORATION
  • US10237245B2 patent drawing
  • US10237245B2 patent drawing
  • US10237245B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method includes a trusted component of a host computing system, obtaining, from a client, via a hypervisor of the host, a request to run an instance of a guest image within the hypervisor. The request includes a unique identifier of the guest image, contents of the guest image, and a communication key. The request is encrypted with a request key accessible to the owner and the trusted component and not accessible to the hypervisor. The trusted component generates an authorization request to an authorizing entity of the client requesting authorization for the hypervisor to run the instance. The authorization request includes the unique identifier, a use counter, and a unique challenge. The trusted component encrypts the authorization request with the communication key and communicates the authorization request to the authorizing entity, via the hypervisor.