Trusted Computing Device Isolated Environment Security
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Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional computer systems are vulnerable to unauthorized access and data manipulation, allowing malicious actors to steal or alter private user information, making them hostile to secure data ownership and communication.
Innovation Solution
A trusted computing device with an isolated environment, including a secure partition and an auxiliary processor, that performs cryptographic operations and manages secure storage and communication, isolating sensitive information from the host system and ensuring secure data integrity and privacy through encryption and secure logging.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If conventional computing systems are used for host computer interactions, then ease of operation and device simplicity are maintained, but security and data integrity are compromised due to vulnerabilities allowing unauthorized access and data manipulation
Solution Approach 1:
The computing system is divided into distinct secure and non-secure partitions. The secure partition contains protected data and trusted computing functions, while the non-secure partition handles general operations. This segmentation prevents unauthorized access from the non-secure side while maintaining overall system functionality.
Solution Approach 2:
A trusted computing device acts as an intermediary between the host computer and secure data storage. This mediator manages access requests, verifies authentication, and controls data flow between secure and non-secure environments, preventing direct unauthorized access while enabling legitimate operations.
2Difficulty of detecting and measuring
If system event logs are made accessible for monitoring, then detection capability is improved, but data integrity is compromised as unauthorized individuals can delete or alter log entries to cover their tracks
Solution Approach 1:
Event logs are prepared and stored in a protected format within the secure partition before any potential tampering can occur. The logging mechanism is pre-configured to write to secure, write-once storage areas that prevent deletion or alteration, ensuring evidence integrity before unauthorized individuals can intervene.
Solution Approach 2:
The event logging function is extracted from the general-purpose non-secure file system and placed within the dedicated secure partition. This separation ensures that logs are stored in a protected environment with controlled access, preventing unauthorized modification while maintaining the ability to detect intrusions.
3Power
If cryptographic operations are performed on the host system, then processing capability is improved, but security is compromised as the host system's vulnerabilities expose cryptographic keys and operations to unauthorized access
Solution Approach 1:
Cryptographic operations are segregated into the secure partition, separate from the host's general processing environment. This isolation ensures that cryptographic keys and sensitive operations remain protected from the host's vulnerabilities while still leveraging the host's processing power for non-sensitive tasks.
Solution Approach 2:
The trusted computing device serves as an intermediary for cryptographic operations. It receives requests from the host, performs secure cryptographic processing within the protected environment, and returns results without exposing keys or sensitive intermediate data to the vulnerable host system.
Data Source
AI summary
A trusted computing device (TCD) includes an isolated environment, host interface, secure interface, and program instructions. The environment includes an isolated environment processor (IEP), memory (secure and non-secure partition), and an auxiliary processor (AP). Memory and AP are connected for data communication with the IEP, and communicate with a host only through the IEP. The host interface and each secure interface are connected for data communication with the IEP. The instructions provision TCD for cryptographic operations via a secure interface; present a first file system partition comprising a write file and a read file with file creation/deletion privileges allocated only to the IEP at the host interface via the IEP; present a non-secured file system partition with access to the non-secure partition via the host interface via the IEP; receive, via the write file, requests to perform trusted computing; perform requested computing using the IEP, secure memory, and AP; and write results to the read file.