Trusted Corevisor Segmentation for Cloud VM Data Security

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Solution Overview

Problem

The increasing reliance on cloud-based virtual machines poses significant security risks due to vulnerabilities in hypervisors and host operating systems, allowing attackers to access sensitive VM data, compromising privacy and integrity.

Innovation Solution

The HypSec system introduces a trusted corevisor that executes at a higher privilege level, isolating and protecting VM data, while delegating less critical functions to an untrusted hostvisor, using hardware virtualization to enforce access control and ensure secure VM boot, CPU, and memory management, with end-to-end encryption for I/O protection.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of manufacture

If hypervisor is integrated with host OS kernel to leverage existing functionality, then implementation and maintenance effort is simplified, but attack surface increases and security risk worsens

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveimplementation effortVSAvoidsecurity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The hypervisor is divided into two distinct portions: a trusted corevisor that executes at a higher exception level (EL2) with full hardware access, and an untrusted hostvisor that executes at a lower exception level (EL1) with restricted access. This segmentation isolates the security-critical functions in the corevisor while allowing the hostvisor to leverage host OS functionality, thus maintaining ease of implementation while improving security by limiting the attack surface to only the essential trusted portion.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

2Ease of operation

If hypervisor executes at higher privilege level to access VM data, then VM control and management is improved, but unauthorized access risk increases

Engineering Contradiction:
ImproveVM controlVSAvoidunauthorized access
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

Different portions of the hypervisor are assigned different privilege levels based on their security requirements. The corevisor executes at EL2 with full access to VM data for essential control functions, while the hostvisor executes at EL1 with restricted access for non-critical management tasks. This local differentiation of privilege levels ensures that VM control is maintained where needed while minimizing unauthorized access risk in less critical areas.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #3Local quality

3Quantity of substance

If cloud providers outsource computational resources to reduce cost, then operational cost is reduced, but trustworthiness of hypervisor infrastructure becomes a concern

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomputational resourcesVSAvoidtrustworthiness
Core Design Contradiction:
Quantity of substanceVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The security-critical trusted computing base is extracted from the untrusted cloud infrastructure and placed in a dedicated corevisor that executes at a higher exception level. This extraction ensures that even if the hostvisor or host OS is compromised or untrustworthy, the corevisor maintains secure control over VM data and operations, thereby preserving trustworthiness while allowing cloud providers to outsource computational resources for cost efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

Data Source

PatentUS12153944B2Systems, methods, and media for trusted hypervisors
Publication Date: 2024.11.26 THE TRUSTEES OF COLUMBIA UNIV IN THE CITY OF NEW YORK
  • US12153944B2 patent drawing
  • US12153944B2 patent drawing
  • US12153944B2 patent drawing

AI summary

Systems comprising: a memory; and a hardware processor and configured to: execute a hypervisor having a first portion and a second portion, wherein the first portion of the hypervisor executes at a first exception level that allows the first portion to access data of a virtual machine in the hardware processor and the memory, and wherein the second portion of the hypervisor executes at a second exception level that prevents the second portion from accessing the data of the virtual machine in the hardware processor and the memory. Methods comprising: executing a first portion of a hypervisor at a first exception level that allows the first portion to access data of a virtual machine in a hardware processor and memory; and executing a second portion of a hypervisor at a second exception level that prevents the second portion from accessing the data in the hardware processor and the memory.