Trusted Entity Integrity Verification for Mobile Terminal Secure Boot
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Solution Overview
Problem
Mobile terminals with unsecure boot chains can allow malicious code to compromise the integrity of the operating system and kernel, leading to unauthorized access and theft of personal or financial information, as well as overriding Digital Rights Management features.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a method and apparatus that uses hardware mechanisms to separate a secure world from a normal world in mobile terminals, where a trusted entity verifies the integrity of entities in the boot process and sends modification indication signals to the secure world upon detecting breaches, ensuring the integrity of the bootloader, kernel, initialization process, Integrity Check Daemon, and modules.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If a secure boot chain is applied only up to bootloader, then the device complexity is reduced and ease of manufacture is improved, but the reliability of the boot process deteriorates and security is compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the system into two distinct worlds: secure world and normal world. The secure world contains the secure boot chain verification mechanisms, while the normal world contains the bootloader and kernel. This segmentation allows the secure boot verification to be isolated and maintained separately, ensuring reliability without complicating the overall manufacturing process.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a trusted entity as an intermediary between the secure world and normal world. This trusted entity verifies the integrity of entities in the normal world by checking hash values against stored reference values. The intermediary mechanism ensures secure boot process reliability without requiring manufacturers to implement complex verification systems throughout the entire boot chain.
2Device complexity
If kernel integrity verification is not implemented, then the device complexity is reduced, but malicious code can compromise the operating system and steal user information
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements preliminary verification of kernel integrity during the boot process. Before the kernel is executed, the trusted entity calculates the hash value of the kernel and compares it with the stored reference hash value. This preliminary action detects any malicious modifications before they can compromise the system, preventing harmful effects without requiring complex runtime security mechanisms.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent replaces physical security mechanisms with cryptographic verification. Instead of relying on hardware-based protection alone, the system uses hash value comparison to verify kernel integrity. This substitution provides robust security against malicious code while maintaining relatively simple device architecture, as cryptographic verification can be implemented through standard processing units.
3Reliability
If secure boot verification is extended to kernel and initialization process, then the integrity protection is improved, but the boot process time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements verification of only the most critical entities in the boot process: bootloader, kernel, and initialization process. By focusing verification efforts on these essential components rather than all software entities, the system achieves adequate integrity protection while minimizing the time overhead. The verification stops once these critical entities are confirmed, avoiding unnecessary delays from excessive verification.
Data Source
AI summary
A method and apparatus for protecting the integrity of a mobile terminal are provided. The mobile terminal includes a secure world for preventing unauthorized access to resources, and a normal world other than the secure world. The integrity protection method for the mobile terminal includes sensing a power-on of the mobile terminal, verifying, by a trusted entity in the normal world, the integrity of a first subsequent entity, and sending, when an integrity breach is detected in the first subsequent entity, by the trusted entity, a modification indication signal to the secure world.