Trusted Execution Area Kernel Mediator for Secure Audit
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Solution Overview
Problem
Modern computer systems using Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) face challenges in isolating data of lower privileged processes from higher privileged processes, particularly when higher privileged processes need to inspect the data for compliance, as existing solutions do not adequately balance data protection and auditability.
Innovation Solution
Establishing a trusted execution area using hardware-based encryption to protect data from other processes while allowing selective access by higher privileged processes, such as the kernel, through decryption keys or whitelisting, enabling secure inspection and auditability without compromising data integrity.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If hardware-based encryption is used to protect data in trusted execution environment, then data security and isolation are improved, but auditability and inspection capability by higher privileged processes deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a kernel as an intermediary component that sits between the encrypted trusted execution environment and the inspection processes. The kernel can decrypt and inspect data from the TEE without other processes being able to access the encrypted data directly, thus maintaining both security and auditability through this mediating layer
Solution Approach 2:
The patent applies different access controls and encryption levels to different processes. Higher privileged processes (like the kernel) are granted special decryption capabilities and inspection rights, while lower privileged processes maintain only encrypted access. This local differentiation of access quality allows simultaneous security and auditability
2Loss of information
If complete isolation is provided between lower privileged processes and higher privileged processes, then data confidentiality is improved, but system management and compliance inspection capability deteriorate
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the system into distinct privilege levels with differentiated access rights. The kernel operates at a higher privilege level with inspection capabilities, while application processes run at lower privilege levels with encrypted isolation. This segmentation allows selective transparency for management purposes while maintaining confidentiality for regular operations
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements dynamic access control where the level of isolation and inspection permission can change based on the process and situation. The kernel can dynamically inspect specific data segments when needed for compliance or debugging, while maintaining default encrypted isolation. This dynamic adjustment balances confidentiality and manageability
Data Source
AI summary
The technology disclosed herein enables a first computing process to execute within a trusted execution environment to protect its data from other processes while selectively enabling a second computing process (e.g., a kernel process) to inspect data for compliance. An example method may include: establishing, by a processor, a trusted execution area for the first computing process, wherein the trusted execution area comprises an encrypted storage area; copying data of the first computing process into the trusted execution area, wherein the data comprises executable data or non-executable data; enabling the second computing process to access the copy of the data of the first computing process; and executing, by the processor, the first computing process using the trusted execution area.