Trusted Measurement Architecture for TPCM Credibility Protection
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Solution Overview
Problem
The trusted measurement agent in trusted computing nodes is vulnerable to attacks, compromising the credibility of the trusted platform control module (TPCM) due to its software-based implementation within the operating system.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a dual secure and trusted execution environment architecture with separate security certificates in each environment, where the TPCM is located in the first secure environment, ensuring mutual signature authentication of measurement requests and data through the second secure environment, thereby excluding the trusted measurement agent from the trusted computing base (TCB).
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If the trusted measurement agent is implemented as software in the operating system, then the system is easier to implement and operate, but the security and credibility of the TPCM deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent divides the measurement system into separate components: a measurement agent running in the operating system and a measurement service running in a secure environment. This segmentation isolates the untrusted software agent from the trusted measurement service, allowing the agent to be easily implemented while the service maintains security through hardware-based isolation.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a secure environment as an intermediary between the untrusted measurement agent and the TPCM. This intermediary (secure environment) receives measurements from the agent, verifies their integrity through cryptographic signatures, and forwards them to the TPCM, thereby protecting the TPCM from attacks by the software agent.
2Device complexity
If the trusted measurement agent runs in the operating system, then the system architecture is simpler, but the security against attacks deteriorates
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the measurement function into two parts: a simple software agent for data collection and a secure environment for measurement processing. This segmentation maintains architectural simplicity for the agent while providing strong security through hardware-based isolation for the measurement service.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the critical measurement processing function from the untrusted operating system environment and places it in a secure, hardware-isolated environment. This extraction removes the vulnerability of running measurement code in the OS while maintaining the simplicity of the software agent.
3Device complexity
If the TPCM relies on the trusted measurement agent, then the system is more straightforward, but the credibility of TPCM is compromised when the agent is attacked
Solution Approach 1:
The patent introduces a secure environment as an intermediary that stands between the measurement agent and the TPCM. This intermediary performs cryptographic verification of measurement data, ensuring that even if the agent is compromised, the TPCM receives only verified and authentic measurements.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent implements prior cushioning by using cryptographic signatures and secure environments to protect against future attacks on the measurement agent. The system is designed in advance to detect and reject tampered measurements, cushioning the TPCM from the harmful effects of agent compromise.
Data Source
AI summary
Trusted measurement methods and trusted computing nodes for improving credibility of trusted platform control module (TPCM) are provided. The method comprises, after a measurement request is initiated, signing, by a first secure and trusted execution environment, the measurement request by using a private key of the first security certificate to obtain a measurement request data packet including a signature, and sending the measurement request data packet to a trusted measurement agent; forwarding, by the trusted measurement agent, the measurement request data packet to a second secure and trusted execution environment; and performing, by the second secure and trusted execution environment, signature verification on the measurement request data packet by using a public key of the first security certificate, obtaining measurement data of a target protection object after the signature verification succeeds, signing the measurement data by using a private key of the second security certificate to obtain a measurement data packet including a signature, and sending the measurement data packet to the trusted measurement agent; and forwarding, by the agent, the measurement data packet to the TPCM, and performing, by the TPCM, signature verification on the measurement data packet by using a public key of the second security certificate, and performing trusted measurement on the target protection object based on the measurement data after the signature verification succeeds.