Trusted-Node QKD Signatures for Secure Non-Full-Mesh Networks

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Solution Overview

Problem

Existing quantum digital signature methods face limitations in non-full-mesh networks and require direct communication between nodes, leading to security risks like eavesdropping and tampering, while trusted center-based methods are difficult to implement due to quantum entanglement and require additional systems.

Innovation Solution

A quantum key distribution (QKD)-based method using a trusted node for generating and verifying signatures in a tree network, sharing secret keys and performing partial QKD processes to ensure secure communication without quantum entanglement, applicable in partial mesh networks.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Ease of manufacture

If direct communication between nodes is used in QKD-based quantum digital signature, then existing QKD equipment can be utilized, but security is compromised due to eavesdropping and tampering risks in non-full-mesh networks

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveusability of existing QKD equipmentVSAvoidsecurity against eavesdropping and tampering
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of manufactureVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces a trusted node as an intermediary between the message-sending node and message-receiving node. This trusted node generates signature values using shared secret keys and transmits them to the receiving node, eliminating the need for direct quantum communication between end nodes while maintaining security. The intermediary approach allows existing QKD equipment to be used without requiring full-mesh direct connections.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If trusted center-based quantum entanglement method is used, then security is improved, but implementation difficulty increases and additional systems are required

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of digital signatureVSAvoidsystem implementation complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent extracts the quantum entanglement requirement from the trusted center-based method while retaining the security benefits. By using QKD-generated secret keys shared between the trusted node and communication nodes, the system achieves secure signatures without requiring quantum entanglement or additional quantum systems beyond standard QKD equipment.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #2Taking out (Extraction)

3Reliability

If full-mesh network structure is required for secure direct communication, then security is maintained, but network adaptability is reduced

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity of direct communicationVSAvoidnetwork structure flexibility
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSAdaptability or versatility

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the quantum communication function into two parts: key distribution (performed between trusted node and communication nodes using existing QKD equipment) and signature generation (performed by the trusted node using shared secret keys). This segmentation allows the system to work in tree networks and other non-full-mesh structures while maintaining security.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS12463804B2Quantum key distribution-based quantum digital signature method and system including trusted node
Publication Date: 2025.11.04 KOREA INST OF SCI & TECH INFORMATION
  • US12463804B2 patent drawing
  • US12463804B2 patent drawing
  • US12463804B2 patent drawing

AI summary

The present disclosure according to at least one embodiment provides a quantum key distribution (QKD)-based quantum digital signature method using a trusted node, the QKD-based quantum digital signature method being performed by a trusted node. The method comprises sharing a first secret key with a message-sending node, sharing a second secret key with a message-receiving node, generating a first trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-sending node, generating a second trusted-node signature by performing a partial QKD process together with the message-receiving node, and verifying a first message with the shared first and second secret keys and with the first and second trusted-node signatures.