Trusted Security Zone Sub Key Generation
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing security measures for electronic communications fail to adequately protect confidential information from both external entities and other trusted service managers within a trusted security zone, leading to potential exposure and unauthorized access.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a trusted security zone with a sub-key generation system that uses a one-way secure hash function to generate user-specific keys and sub-keys, allowing multiple trusted service managers to access specific containers while preventing access to each other's data, and ensuring that only authorized entities can access the trusted security zone.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Adaptability or versatility
If a trusted security zone with master key access is implemented for multiple trusted service managers, then access to secure containers is enabled, but internal unauthorized access between trusted service managers becomes possible
Solution Approach 1:
The patent segments the master key into multiple components distributed among different trusted service managers. Each manager holds only a portion of the key material, and no single manager can reconstruct the full master key independently. This segmentation prevents any one trusted service manager from accessing containers belonging to other managers while still enabling collaborative secure access when needed.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a key derivation function as an intermediary mechanism that transforms the segmented key material into manager-specific access keys. This intermediary process ensures that even though all trusted service managers participate in the security system, each manager receives a unique derived key that can only access their own containers, preventing internal unauthorized access.
2Reliability
If existing security measures are used for electronic communications, then basic security is provided, but confidential information remains vulnerable to tampering and intrusion
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements nested security by placing trusted security zones within the mobile device, containing trusted service managers, which in turn contain encrypted data containers. Each layer provides security validation for the next, creating a nested structure where multiple levels of trust verification are required before any confidential information can be accessed, thereby preventing unauthorized access at each layer.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent changes the security parameter from simple key possession to cryptographic proof of authorization. Instead of relying on traditional authentication, the system requires trusted service managers to present cryptographic proofs that validate their authority to access specific containers. This parameter change transforms the security model from access control lists to zero-knowledge proof-based authorization.
3Device complexity
If a master key provides access to all containers, then simplified key management is achieved, but isolation between different trusted service managers is lost
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by pre-distributing segmented key material to each trusted service manager during system initialization, before any data storage or access operations occur. This preliminary distribution of key components ensures that from the outset, each manager has the necessary cryptographic material to access only their designated containers, eliminating the need for complex runtime key management while maintaining data isolation.
Data Source
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AI summary
Embodiments relate generally to systems and methods for providing access to a trusted security zone container within a trusted security zone of a mobile device. An application may receive trusted service manager validation data from a trusted service manager. The application may also receive a trusted security zone master key, wherein the trusted security zone master key provides access to a plurality of trusted security zone containers within the trusted security zone. The application may hash the trusted service manager validation data with the trusted security zone master key. The application may generate the trusted security zone sub key based on hashing to access one or more containers. One or more signal may be transmitted to provision the set of one or more trusted security zone containers with the trusted security zone sub key. The application may provide the sub key to the trusted service manager to access a container.