Topological Vulnerability Analysis for Network Attack Path Modeling

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current network vulnerability analysis tools fail to effectively consider the interdependency of vulnerabilities and connectivity in networks, making it difficult to assess how attackers can combine vulnerabilities to compromise critical resources, and they lack scalability and efficiency in analyzing attack paths.

Innovation Solution

The Topological Vulnerability Analysis (TVA) system models network security conditions and attack techniques, automatically populates models using vulnerability scanners, and analyzes exploit sequences to identify all possible attack paths, employing efficient exploit-dependency representation and interactive visualization to manage complexity, allowing for scalable and cost-effective network hardening.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Measurement precision

If traditional vulnerability analysis tools are used to identify vulnerabilities in isolation, then vulnerability detection is achieved, but the ability to assess combined attack paths and true network vulnerability is insufficient

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvevulnerability assessment accuracyVSAvoidattack path analysis complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the attack graph into manageable components by representing exploits as nodes and dependencies as edges, allowing complex attack paths to be analyzed through structured decomposition. This segmentation enables precise vulnerability assessment while managing complexity through organized representation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent transitions from traditional two-dimensional vulnerability lists to a multi-dimensional attack graph structure that incorporates vulnerability dependencies, attack paths, and network topology. This dimensional expansion enables comprehensive vulnerability assessment without overwhelming complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #17Another dimension (Dimensionality change)

2Reliability

If all possible attack paths are enumerated to ensure complete security analysis, then thorough vulnerability assessment is achieved, but computational complexity and time requirements increase exponentially

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity analysis completenessVSAvoidanalysis efficiency
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSProductivity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary actions by pre-computing and storing exploit dependency relationships and attack path templates before actual vulnerability assessment. This allows rapid analysis of network-specific vulnerabilities by combining pre-computed structures with actual network data, achieving complete security analysis without exponential time requirements.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The patent creates a universal attack graph framework that can analyze multiple network configurations and vulnerability scenarios using the same underlying structure. This multi-functional approach enables thorough security assessment across different networks without re-computing entire attack graphs, significantly improving analysis efficiency.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #6Universality (Multi-functionality)

3Loss of information

If manual penetration testing is performed to analyze attack paths, then deep security insight is achieved, but labor intensity and analysis time are excessive

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvesecurity insight qualityVSAvoidanalysis time
Core Design Contradiction:
Loss of informationVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The patent implements self-service automation where the system automatically generates attack graphs, identifies vulnerability dependencies, and proposes hardening measures without requiring manual penetration testing. The automated attack graph generation and analysis processes provide deep security insights while reducing analysis time from weeks to minutes.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

Solution Approach 2:

The patent incorporates feedback mechanisms where the system continuously refines attack path analysis based on network configuration changes and vulnerability updates. This feedback-driven approach maintains high security insight quality while adapting to changing network conditions without requiring manual re-testing.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

4Ease of operation

If detailed attack graph visualization is provided to manage complexity, then understanding of vulnerability relationships is improved, but system complexity and resource requirements increase

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvecomplexity managementVSAvoidvisualization system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Ease of operationVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the attack graph visualization into hierarchical levels, allowing users to navigate complexity through organized layers. This segmentation enables detailed vulnerability relationship understanding while managing system complexity through structured presentation.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent implements dynamic visualization capabilities that automatically adjust graph rendering based on user interactions and network size. This dynamic adaptation provides effective complexity management without requiring overly complex static visualization systems.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #15Dynamics

Data Source

PatentUS7904962B1Network attack modeling, analysis, and response
Publication Date: 2011.03.08 GEORGE MASON INTPROP INC
  • US7904962B1 patent drawing
  • US7904962B1 patent drawing
  • US7904962B1 patent drawing

AI summary

Disclosed is a system for modeling, analyzing, and responding to network attacks. Machines are mapped to components, components are mapped to vulnerabilities, and vulnerabilities are mapped to exploits. Each of the exploits includes at least one precondition mapped to at least one postcondition. An attack graph which defines inter-exploit distances is generated using at least one of the exploits. The attack graph is aggregated. At least one hardening option is determined using the aggregated attack graph. Hardening options include applying at least one corrective measure to at least one initial condition, where the initial condition is the initial state of a precondition.