Two-Party Encrypted Storage for Sensitive Data
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Solution Overview
Problem
Electronic commerce systems face significant risks in securely storing confidential customer information, as central repositories can be vulnerable to breaches affecting multiple clients, and compliance with industry standards is time-consuming and costly, while third-party storage may not fully mitigate liability.
Innovation Solution
A secure storage system employs two-party storage by encrypting information with a first key, then a second key, dividing the data into portions, and providing clients with an identifier and one portion while storing the other portion securely, ensuring that even if one party is breached, only partial information is compromised.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of manufacture
If confidential information is stored at a central repository, then the burden of implementing secure systems and obtaining certifications is borne by the software development organization rather than each client, but a breach of the central repository risks the confidential information of all customers of all clients
Solution Approach 1:
The confidential information is divided into multiple segments or portions, with different parts stored at different locations (central repository and distributed to clients). This segmentation ensures that a breach at any single location only exposes partial information, not the complete confidential data set.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements nested encryption where confidential information is encrypted with a first key, and that first key is then encrypted with a second key. This creates nested layers of security where each layer protects the previous one, allowing the system to maintain security while distributing storage responsibilities.
2Reliability
If third parties are contracted to store confidential information at secure storage vaults, then security storage is specialized, but the software development organization may still be liable if security is breached
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting the confidential information and distributing portions to multiple parties (clients and secure storage vaults), the system reduces the liability concentration. No single party, including third-party vaults, holds complete confidential information, thereby reducing the software development organization's liability exposure.
Solution Approach 2:
The system introduces encrypted keys and segmentation as intermediaries between the confidential information and storage locations. These intermediaries protect the relationship between the software development organization and third-party vaults, reducing direct liability while maintaining security.
3Reliability
If confidential information is divided into portions and distributed between client and secure storage system, then the risk of complete data exposure is reduced, but the system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system divides confidential information into multiple portions and distributes them between clients and the secure storage system. This segmentation reduces the impact of potential breaches while managing complexity through structured key management and portion distribution protocols.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the state of the confidential information by applying multiple encryption keys (first key and second key) and dividing into portions. These parameter changes (encryption, division, distribution) enhance security while the systematic approach manages the associated complexity.
Data Source
AI summary
A secure storage system secures information of a client by first encrypting the information with a first key to generate first-key encrypted data. The secure storage system then encrypts with a second key the first-key encrypted data and the first key to generate second-key encrypted data. The system provides the client with a first portion of the second-key encrypted data. The system stores a second portion of the second-key encrypted data and the second key. When the confidential information is needed, the client provides the first portion. The system retrieves the second portion. The system then decrypts with the second key the first portion and the second portion to generate the first-key encrypted data and the first key. The system then decrypts with the first key the first-key encrypted data to generate the unsecure confidential information.