UAM Aircraft Mutual Authentication Against Cockpit Hacking
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Urban air mobility (UAM) aircraft are vulnerable to attacks where unauthorized individuals can hack into the cockpit and control the aircraft, posing a significant risk to flight safety.
Innovation Solution
The implementation of a two-channel authentication method and mutual authentication between a pilot and a security manager, using a challenge-response process with an authentication server, to ensure only authenticated personnel can control the aircraft.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If traditional authentication methods are used for UAM aircraft, then the authentication process is simple, but the system is vulnerable to hacking and unauthorized control
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication system is segmented into multiple independent channels: a first channel for pilot authentication and a second channel for security manager authentication. Each channel operates independently with its own challenge-response process, preventing a single point of failure and enhancing overall system reliability against hacking attempts.
Solution Approach 2:
The system performs preliminary authentication actions before allowing aircraft control. The challenge-response process is executed in advance, where the authentication server generates challenges, the pilot terminal and aircraft system respond with cryptographic proofs, and only after successful verification are authentication tokens issued. This preliminary action ensures that unauthorized control attempts are blocked before they can affect flight safety.
2Reliability
If mutual authentication between pilot and security manager is implemented, then unauthorized access is prevented, but the authentication process time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication process uses periodic challenge-response exchanges rather than continuous verification. The authentication server periodically issues challenges, and the pilot terminal and aircraft system respond with cryptographic proofs. This periodic action structure allows the system to achieve thorough mutual authentication while maintaining efficient timing, as the challenges are discrete and can be processed rapidly.
Solution Approach 2:
The system replaces traditional mechanical or manual authentication methods with cryptographic mechanisms. Instead of physical key exchanges or manual verification procedures, the patent uses digital challenge-response protocols where the authentication server, pilot terminal, and aircraft system exchange cryptographic challenges and responses. This substitution enables faster, more automated authentication that prevents unauthorized access without significant time loss.
3Reliability
If authentication tokens are transmitted between multiple systems, then mutual authentication is achieved, but the communication channels become vulnerable to interception
Solution Approach 1:
The authentication server acts as a trusted intermediary that mediates all authentication token transmissions. Rather than allowing direct peer-to-peer token exchange between the pilot terminal and aircraft system, the authentication server generates, verifies, and distributes tokens through controlled channels. This intermediary role ensures that tokens are transmitted through secure, authenticated pathways, reducing vulnerability to interception while maintaining authentication validity.
Solution Approach 2:
The system changes the parameters of token transmission by using cryptographic transformation. Authentication tokens are not transmitted in plain text but are encrypted and signed using cryptographic algorithms. The challenge-response process generates dynamic tokens that are valid only for specific transactions, and the tokens include cryptographic parameters that prevent replay attacks. This parameter transformation protects against interception while ensuring authentication validity.
Data Source
Figure 1
Figure 2
Figure 3A
AI summary
An embodiment method includes performing pilot authentication based on a first challenge-response process with an authentication server, transmitting first flight information to the authentication server, receiving a first authentication token provided in response to verification of the first flight information in the authentication server, transmitting the first authentication token to an aircraft system, receiving a second authentication token from the aircraft system, the second authentication token being transmitted by the aircraft system to the authentication server when authentication for a security manager boarding the aircraft succeeds based on a second challenge-response process performed between the aircraft system and the authentication server, wherein the second authentication token corresponds to that provided to the aircraft system in response to verification by the authentication server for second flight information, and sharing a session key and a message authentication code key with the aircraft system when mutual authentication succeeds.