UAV Control Station Segregating Critical and Non-Critical Systems
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) control stations lack compliance with aerospace safety standards and interoperability requirements, particularly when operating in non-segregated airspace, leading to inadequate safety and operational inefficiencies.
Innovation Solution
A control station architecture with segregated critical and non-critical systems, featuring redundant components and networks, including at least two redundant critical computers and UAV-specific computers, a gateway computer for centralized data exchange, and multiple operator consoles to ensure fail-safe operations and avoid single points of failure.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If existing control station architectures are used, then operational simplicity is maintained, but compliance with aerospace safety standards cannot be achieved
Solution Approach 1:
The control station is divided into separate critical and non-critical systems. Critical systems include redundant flight control computers and communication modules that directly impact safety, while non-critical systems handle user interface and data logging. This segmentation allows targeted application of safety standards to only the necessary components, achieving compliance without unnecessarily complicating the entire system.
Solution Approach 2:
A safety monitoring module is introduced as an intermediary between the critical systems and non-critical systems. This module continuously monitors the state of critical components and can intervene to prevent unsafe operations, thereby ensuring safety compliance while allowing the rest of the control station to maintain operational simplicity.
2Reliability
If redundant critical systems are implemented, then safety and fail-safe operations are improved, but system complexity and acquisition costs increase
Solution Approach 1:
Redundant critical computers are merged into a single fail-safe control unit where both computational resources share common processing logic and memory structures. This merging reduces the physical footprint and complexity of implementing redundancy, as the system can switch between computational instances rather than maintaining completely separate hardware paths.
Solution Approach 2:
The redundant critical systems are designed with universal interfaces and standardized protocols that allow the same hardware configuration to serve multiple UAV types and mission profiles. This multi-functionality reduces acquisition costs by eliminating the need for separate redundant system configurations for different operational scenarios.
3Adaptability or versatility
If generic control stations are designed for multiple UAV types, then operational benefits and cost reduction are achieved, but compliance with safety regulations becomes difficult
Solution Approach 1:
The generic control station employs a segmented architecture where the critical safety-related functions are isolated from UAV-specific operations. This allows the critical segment to maintain consistent safety compliance across different UAV types, while the non-critical segment can be adapted to specific UAV configurations without compromising safety standards.
Solution Approach 2:
A standardized interface layer is introduced as an intermediary between the generic control station and various UAV-specific systems. This interface layer ensures that all UAV types communicate through standardized protocols that can be verified for safety compliance, while allowing the underlying UAV-specific implementations to vary without affecting the safety-critical communication paths.
Data Source
AI summary
An Unmanned Air Vehicle control station, comprising critical systems implementing safety involved functions, non-critical systems implementing non-safety involved functions and a gateway computer. The critical systems comprise at least two redundant critical computers, a redundant critical network and critical back-up network, and at least two redundant UAV-specific computers that implement UAV-specific functions and communicate with the UAV, wherein the at least two critical computers and the at least two UAV-specific computers are connected to the critical network and to the critical back-up network. The non-critical systems comprise at least one non-critical computer, and a non-critical network, wherein the at least one non-critical computer is connected to the non-critical network. The gateway computer centralizes and supervises data exchanges between the critical and non-critical systems, such that the control station comprises a plurality of redundant operator consoles, each operator console comprising at least two redundant critical computers and a non-critical computer.