UMAD UAS Security via Dummy ADS-B Broadcasting
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Solution Overview
Problem
The implementation of ADS-B in unmanned aerial systems (UAS) poses security vulnerabilities due to lack of encryption and anonymity, compromising sensitive flight information, which is a concern for entities operating in the National Airspace System (NAS).
Innovation Solution
A system and method for UAS modernization, known as UMAD, generates and broadcasts dummy aircraft identification and airframe information using automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast signals, providing secure enhanced flight awareness by masking the actual UAS identity and characteristics, thereby securing UAS operations.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If UAS broadcasts actual identification and airframe information using ADS-B signals, then air traffic control and other aircraft can accurately identify and track the UAS, but security vulnerabilities arise allowing unauthorized entities to access sensitive flight information
Solution Approach 1:
The system creates and transmits a copy (dummy) of the actual aircraft identification and airframe information through ADS-B signals. This dummy data mimics the structure and format of real aircraft data, allowing air traffic control systems to process and track the UAS as if it were a legitimate aircraft, while the actual sensitive information remains protected from unauthorized access
Solution Approach 2:
The dummy aircraft information acts as an intermediary between the UAS and external entities (air traffic control, other aircraft). This intermediary layer allows the UAS to communicate its presence and status for safety purposes while preventing direct access to sensitive operational information, thus resolving the contradiction between identification accuracy and security
2Object-affected harmful factors
If UAS masks actual identity by broadcasting dummy information, then security is enhanced preventing unauthorized access to sensitive flight data, but air traffic control may have difficulty accurately identifying and tracking the UAS
Solution Approach 1:
The system changes certain parameters of the aircraft identification data by substituting actual sensitive information with dummy values while maintaining the overall data structure and format. This allows the data to remain compatible with air traffic control systems for tracking purposes while protecting sensitive parameters from unauthorized access
3Loss of information
If UAS broadcasts dummy airframe information, then sensitive UAS characteristics are protected from interception, but traffic awareness accuracy for other aircraft may be reduced
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies different quality levels to different parts of the transmitted information. Sensitive local characteristics (specific airframe details) are masked with dummy data, while non-sensitive overall parameters (position, altitude, velocity) are transmitted accurately. This allows traffic awareness to remain sufficiently accurate for safety purposes while protecting sensitive local information
Data Source
AI summary
A computer-implemented method for securing unmanned aerial system (UAS) operations includes receiving a UAS flight plan for a UAS and a UAS operation, the UAS flight plan including a flight profile and flight path for the UAS; determining a mission type for the UAS operation requires use of dummy aircraft information; and assigning a dummy UAS identification for the UAS. Generating dummy airframe information, including dummy airframe characteristics and performance data, for the UAS, includes generating dummy airframe information that corresponds to airframe information for an actual civil aircraft that could follow the received UAS flight plan. The method further includes causing the UAS to broadcast the dummy UAS identification and the dummy airframe information with an automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast signal during at least a portion of the UAS operation.