Unattended Deployment Key Validation for Secure Zero-Touch Setup

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Solution Overview

Problem

Implementing unattended deployment of information handling systems is challenging due to the risk of enabling protocols to access platform settings, particularly in systems lacking an out-of-band manager, such as a baseboard management controller (BMC), which creates security concerns for creating and supporting a secure environment.

Innovation Solution

An unattended deployment method employing 3-factor authentication and dynamic trust factor evaluation is used to validate and execute digitally signed deployment scripts stored on a trusted hardware key, referred to as the deployment key, which is validated against a nonvolatile key bound to a nonvolatile storage component, enabling a secure execution environment called deploy mode that allows unsigned code execution and configuration of platform settings.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Extent of automation

If unattended deployment protocols are enabled to access platform settings, then deployment automation is improved, but system security is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvedeployment automationVSAvoidsystem security risk
Core Design Contradiction:
Extent of automationVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the authentication process into three distinct factors: possession factor (deployment key), knowledge factor (password), and inherence factor (hardware binding). This segmentation allows each factor to address a specific security concern independently, enabling automated deployment while maintaining comprehensive security validation that prevents unauthorized access to platform settings.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Solution Approach 2:

The patent introduces a trusted server as an intermediary that generates and manages the deployment key and its associated authentication credentials. This intermediary validates the deployment protocol's identity and establishes a secure channel between the automated deployment system and the platform settings, reducing security risks by mediating the authentication process rather than allowing direct access.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If 3-factor authentication and trust factor evaluation are implemented, then system security is improved, but deployment complexity is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
Improveauthentication securityVSAvoiddeployment process complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent performs preliminary actions by pre-generating the deployment key, password, and hardware binding credentials through a trusted server before the actual deployment process. The deployment key is created with all necessary authentication factors already configured and validated. This preliminary setup eliminates the need for complex real-time authentication negotiations during deployment, as the security credentials are already established and ready for use.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Solution Approach 2:

The deployment protocol automatically performs trust factor evaluation by validating the deployment key against the platform's hardware identifier and verifying the password credential without requiring manual intervention. The system self-services the complex authentication process by autonomously evaluating all three trust factors and making authorization decisions, thereby maintaining high security while reducing operational complexity.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #25Self-service

3Reliability

If deployment key validation against nonvolatile key is performed, then trust factor evaluation is improved, but authentication time is worsened

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvetrust factor validationVSAvoidauthentication duration
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSLoss of time

Solution Approach 1:

The trusted server performs preliminary validation of the deployment key against the nonvolatile hardware key during the key generation phase, before the actual deployment occurs. This pre-validation ensures that the deployment key is cryptographically bound to the specific hardware platform. During the actual deployment, this preliminary binding allows for faster authentication since the trust relationship has already been established and verified in advance.

Inventive Principle:
Principle #10Preliminary action

Data Source

PatentUS11675908B2Unattended deployment of information handling systems
Publication Date: 2023.06.13 DELL PROD LP
  • US11675908B2 patent drawing
  • US11675908B2 patent drawing
  • US11675908B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method for deploying an information handling system (platform) determines whether a hardware key coupled to the platform constitutes a deployment key by validating a GUID of the key against a deployment key signature, generated by a trusted server and stored on the key. If the key is validated, a trust factor evaluation is performed by validating the deployment key against a second key, which is bound to a nonvolatile storage component containing a second key signature, generated by the trusted server based on a GUID of the nonvolatile storage component. Upon validating the trust factor, the platform boots into an unattended deployment mode loaded from the deployment key and validates an unattended deployment binary stored in the deployment key against the second key signature to establish a trusted execution session for loading unattended deployment modules from the deployment key and deploying the platform by executing the unattended deployment modules.