Unified CA for Cross-Group Service Authentication
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication techniques in software systems deployed across untrusted networks are inadequate in preventing man-in-the-middle and spoofing attacks, particularly when managing communications between control and data planes in software-defined storage systems, where establishing trust with multiple intermediate CAs is impractical and insecure.
Innovation Solution
A method is introduced to provide two-way secure channels between services across service groups by using a Certificate Authority (CA) hosted in the control plane to sign certificates for both control and data plane services, enabling Transport Layer Security (TLS) trust and authenticating communications through identity and access management services, thereby avoiding the need for multiple intermediate CAs and simplifying certificate management.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If multiple intermediate CAs are used to establish trust between service groups, then authentication security is improved, but system complexity and management overhead increase significantly
Solution Approach 1:
The patent merges multiple intermediate CAs into a single root CA that signs certificates for all services across different service groups. This consolidation maintains authentication security by establishing a unified trust anchor while eliminating the complexity of managing multiple intermediate CAs, including their distribution, storage, and validation across the distributed system.
Solution Approach 2:
The root CA serves as a universal trust authority for all services in the system, including both control plane and data plane services. This single CA performs the function that previously required multiple intermediate CAs, providing broad applicability and simplifying the certificate validation process across diverse service groups while maintaining security requirements.
2Reliability
If frequent certificate rotation is implemented to enhance security, then security posture is improved, but operational overhead and system downtime increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by pre-distributing the root CA certificate to all services during initial deployment. This allows services to have the trust anchor ready in advance, enabling rapid certificate rotation without requiring time-consuming distribution of new intermediate CA certificates. The preliminary establishment of trust enables quick security updates when needed.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent extracts the trust validation logic from intermediate CA certificates and anchors it directly in the root CA certificate that is stored locally at each service. This extraction eliminates the need to redistribute intermediate CA certificates during rotation events, allowing frequent security updates without the operational overhead of managing intermediate certificate lifecycles across the distributed system.
3Device complexity
If a single root CA is used to sign certificates for both control and data plane services, then certificate management is simplified, but trust boundaries between service groups may be compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The system implements local quality by storing the root CA certificate in local trust stores at each service (control plane and data plane services separately). This local caching of the trust anchor allows each service to independently validate certificates while maintaining the simplification of a single root CA. The local quality of having the root CA readily available preserves trust boundaries without requiring multiple intermediate CAs.
Solution Approach 2:
The root CA acts as an intermediary that signs certificates for both control and data plane services without directly managing the operational trust boundaries between them. By using the root CA as a mediator that issues certificates to both service groups, the system simplifies certificate management while the actual trust boundary enforcement occurs at the service level through local certificate validation, not through hierarchical CA structures.
Data Source
AI summary
Two-way secure channels are provided between multiple services across service groups, where the certification is performed by a certificate authority associated with one of the service groups. One method comprises a first service providing a first handshake communication with a first token to a second service, wherein the first service obtains the first token by authenticating with an identity and access management service having a first certificate signed by a certificate authority, wherein the first handshake communication succeeds when the second service has a second certificate signed by the certificate authority, and wherein the second service obtains a second token by authenticating with the identity and access management service. The first service receives a second handshake communication from the second service with the second token. Communications are enabled between the first and second services over a two-way authenticated channel when the first service has a third certificate signed by the certificate authority.