USB Controller Binding Identity Policy Enforcement
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Solution Overview
Problem
Current computing devices lack secure enforcement of USB device policies, especially when untrusted software is present, as they do not effectively protect I/O data across the on-chip boundary and cannot ensure that only authorized software restricts device usage.
Innovation Solution
A computing device that generates a binding identity within a firmware secure enclave, securely provisions it to a USB controller, and uses a policy enforcement enclave to enforce device usage policies by verifying the identity in each command, ensuring only trusted software can restrict device usage, even in the presence of untrusted operating systems.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If USB device policies are enforced without secure enclave binding identity verification, then device operation is simple and fast, but security is compromised and unauthorized software can restrict device usage
Solution Approach 1:
The patent implements a nested security architecture where a binding identity is embedded within the USB controller's secure enclave, and policy enforcement commands are nested within authenticated message structures. The binding identity contains cryptographic credentials that are nested within the controller's secure memory, creating multiple layers of verification that enhance security without proportionally increasing external complexity.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces a binding identity as an intermediary credential between the USB controller and policy enforcement software. This binding identity acts as a mediator that verifies the authenticity of policy commands without requiring the controller to directly trust the software, thus enhancing security while maintaining a relatively simple control flow.
2Reliability
If I/O data is allowed to move across the on-chip boundary without cryptographic protection, then data transfer speed is high, but data integrity and confidentiality are compromised
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary cryptographic protection by sealing the binding identity with a cryptographic key before the I/O data transfer occurs. This pre-established security credential is then used to authenticate and protect the data during transit across the on-chip boundary, ensuring integrity without adding real-time encryption overhead that would slow down the actual data transfer.
3Adaptability or versatility
If USB device policies are enforced without binding identity verification, then software can freely restrict device usage, but authorized software cannot be distinguished from untrusted software
Solution Approach 1:
The patent uses cryptographic binding identities as a form of digital 'coloring' or identification marker that distinguishes authorized software from untrusted software. The binding identity acts as a unique credential that changes the trust status of software, allowing the system to differentiate between authorized policy enforcement commands and unauthorized attempts, thus enabling reliable policy enforcement.
4Reliability
If secure enclave binding identity verification is implemented, then only authorized software can enforce policies, but the system requires additional cryptographic verification steps
Solution Approach 1:
The binding identity is established and verified in advance during system initialization or device attachment, rather than being verified for every single command. This preliminary verification creates a trusted state that persists through subsequent operations, reducing the time overhead for individual policy enforcement commands while maintaining strong authorization guarantees.
Data Source
AI summary
Technologies for USB device policy enforcement include a computing device having a USB controller and secure enclave support. On boot, a firmware enclave randomly generates a binding identity and then securely provisions the binding identity to the USB controller. The firmware enclave also seals the binding identity to a policy enforcement enclave. At runtime, the policy enforcement enclave unseals the binding identity and includes the binding identity in a policy enforcement command sent to the USB controller. The USB controller verifies that the binding identity included in the command matches the binding identity that was previously provisioned. If the binding identities are successfully verified, the USB controller enforces the command. The USB controller may block data transfers or device configuration changes for one or more specified devices. Each of the firmware enclave and the policy enforcement enclave are trusted execution environments. Other embodiments are described and claimed.


