Username-Based Authentication Protocol for Secure Channel Verification
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing authentication methods over insecure channels require passwords to be transmitted in clear text, making them vulnerable to eavesdropping and brute force attacks, and often necessitate secure connections, which is not always feasible.
Innovation Solution
A username-based authentication protocol that uses a server-generated authentication challenge including a random string, timestamp, and signature value to calculate a salt value, allowing clients to compute hashed passwords without exposing the password in clear text, and verifies the authenticity using message authentication codes (MACs) over an unsecured channel.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Ease of operation
If password is transmitted in clear text for authentication, then authentication can be performed over any channel, but the password becomes vulnerable to eavesdropping and brute force attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The server pre-computes and stores hashed password values with salts before authentication is needed. During authentication, the server sends a challenge that allows the client to compute the correct hashed value locally without transmitting the actual password, thus preparing security measures in advance
Solution Approach 2:
A cryptographic challenge-response mechanism acts as an intermediary between the client and server. The challenge includes a random string and timestamp that mediates the authentication process, allowing verification without direct password transmission
2Reliability
If secure connection is used to protect password transmission, then eavesdropping is prevented, but the connection requirement limits system accessibility
Solution Approach 1:
The password is extracted from the authentication process entirely. Instead of transmitting or protecting the password during authentication, the system uses the password only to pre-compute hashed values that are then verified through cryptographic challenges, removing the password from vulnerable transmission paths
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication mechanism changes from password-based to hashed-value-based verification. By transforming the password into a hashed form with salts and using cryptographic functions, the system achieves security without requiring secure transmission channels
3Reliability
If random salt value is used for each password hash, then brute force attacks are hindered, but the same password cannot be used across multiple systems
Solution Approach 1:
The server pre-computes hashed password values using stored salts before authentication is needed. This preliminary computation allows the same password to be verified across multiple systems without requiring the password to be transmitted or re-hashed with different random salts at authentication time
Solution Approach 2:
The authentication mechanism is designed to be universal across multiple systems. By using a consistent hashing approach with pre-stored salts and cryptographic challenges, the same password can authenticate on different systems while maintaining security through the challenge-response mechanism
Data Source
AI summary
An apparatus and a method for an authentication protocol. In one embodiment, a client requests for an authentication challenge from a server. The server generates the authentication challenge and sends it to the client. The authentication challenge includes the authentication context identifier, a random string, a timestamp, and a signature value. The client computes a salt value based on a username and the authentication context identifier from the authentication challenge. The signature value is computed based on the authentication context identifier, the random string, and the timestamp. The client computes a hashed password value based on the computed salt value, and a message authentication code based on the hashed password value and the random string. The client sends a response to the server. The response includes the username, the message authentication code, the random string, the timestamp, and the signature value.