5G Parameter Storage in USIM to Prevent ME Hijacking

Resolve Bottlenecks,
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions

Solution Overview

Problem

The interworking between non-5G compliant USIMs and 5G compliant MEs is unclear in 3GPP specifications, leading to potential security concerns as MEs are not considered anti-tampered, making them vulnerable to attacks, which can result in hijacking of UE, creating a security hole in 5GS.

Innovation Solution

A method for UE that checks for 5G specific parameters in both ME and SIM, sending a message to a network node to fetch 5G specific parameter values from a unified data management system, ensuring secure storage and updating of these parameters to prevent tampering.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Adaptability or versatility

If 5G specific parameters are stored in ME to enable interworking with non-5G compliant USIMs, then adaptability is improved, but security is worsened as ME is vulnerable to tampering attacks

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveinterworking capabilityVSAvoidsecurity

Core Design Contradiction:

Adaptability or versatilityVSReliability

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces an intermediary mechanism where the USIM card stores 5G specific parameters (home network public key, home network public key ID, protection scheme ID) instead of the ME. This intermediary storage location provides anti-tampering protection while enabling the ME to interwork with both 4G and 5G networks. The USIM acts as a secure mediator that protects sensitive parameters from attacks on the ME.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

2Reliability

If 5G specific parameters are stored in USIM to enhance security, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened due to additional parameters and functionalities

Engineering Contradiction:

ImprovesecurityVSAvoidparameter complexity

Core Design Contradiction:

ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent segments the functionality and parameters between USIM and ME. The USIM is assigned specific 5G security parameters (home network public key, home network public key ID, protection scheme ID) while the ME handles network communication and service operations. This segmentation allows security-critical parameters to be isolated in the tamper-resistant USIM, reducing overall system complexity by clearly defining responsibility boundaries.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #1Segmentation

3Productivity

If all 5G specific parameters are stored in ME to provide 5G services, then productivity is improved, but security is worsened creating potential hijacking vulnerabilities

Engineering Contradiction:

Improveservice provisioningVSAvoidhijacking risk

Core Design Contradiction:

ProductivityVSObject-affected harmful factors

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies preliminary anti-action by pre-storing 5G specific parameters in the USIM before any network operations occur. This preemptive measure ensures that sensitive parameters are already protected in a secure location, preventing potential hijacking attacks. The USIM's anti-tampering properties provide advance protection against security threats that could compromise service provisioning.

Inventive Principle:

Principle #9Preliminary anti-action

Data Source

PatentUS20240349037A1Procedure to update the parameters related to unified access control

Publication Date: 2024.10.17 NEC CORP

AI summary

The present disclosure relates to a method for a user equipment, UE, which includes a mobile equipment, ME, and a subscriber identity module, SIM. The method comprises checking whether the ME and the SIM have a 5th generation, 5G, specific parameter or not, and sending, to a network node, a first message containing a first information element, IE, indicating whether the UE has a valid 5G specific parameter or not, so as to fetch a 5G specific parameter value from a unified data management, UDM.