UWB Receiver Attack Mitigation via Random Sequence Extensions
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Solution Overview
Problem
UWB communication technology is vulnerable to attacks that manipulate distance measurements by sending strong pulses at specific times, leading to erroneous detection of the first path and inaccurate distance calculations.
Innovation Solution
The UWB receiver incorporates an attack mitigation unit that adds random data extensions to the predefined sequence, detects the maximum amplitude of the input signal to set a threshold, and uses a limiter to clip high peak values, thereby mitigating attacks and ensuring accurate distance measurements.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Reliability
If the UWB receiver uses a standard correlation function to detect the first path, then the detection process is simple and fast, but the system becomes vulnerable to attacks that manipulate distance measurements by sending strong pulses at specific times
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies preliminary action by extending the predefined sequence with random data before the actual correlation operation. This extension is prepared in advance to prevent attacks, where the random extensions are added to the sequence before correlation with the input signal, creating a protective mechanism that operates before the main detection function is executed.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses an intermediary approach by introducing random data extensions as a mediating element between the input signal and the correlation function. These extensions act as a shield that interferes with attack signals while allowing legitimate signals to pass through, effectively mediating the interaction between the receiver and potential attackers.
2Reliability
If the UWB receiver processes the entire extended sequence for correlation, then attack mitigation is enhanced, but the processing time and computational load increase
Solution Approach 1:
The patent applies segmentation by dividing the correlation process into distinct phases: first correlating with the random data extensions to detect and filter attack signals, then correlating with the actual predefined sequence for legitimate signal detection. This segmentation allows the system to handle different parts of the sequence differently, optimizing both security and processing efficiency.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent uses partial action by selectively applying correlation processing only where necessary. The random extensions are processed to detect attacks, and based on this detection, the system can adjust the processing of the main sequence, avoiding full processing of the entire extended sequence in all cases and thus reducing unnecessary computational load.
Data Source
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AI summary
In accordance with a first aspect of the present disclosure, an ultra-wideband (UWB) receiver is provided, comprising: an attack mitigation unit configured to mitigate one or more attacks on a correlation function; a correlation unit configured to perform the correlation function by correlating an input signal received by the UWB receiver with a predefined sequence and to generate a correlation output based on correlating said input signal with the predefined sequence; and a first path detection unit configured to receive the correlation output and to detect a first path by evaluating the correlator output during a correlation window, said correlation window being a predefined period of time. In accordance with a second aspect of the present disclosure, a corresponding method of operating a UWB receiver is conceived. In accordance with a third aspect of the present disclosure, a computer program is provided for carrying out said method.