UWB Secure Ranging via Segmented Cryptographic Training Sequences
Find Innovative SolutionsGenerate Solutions
Solution Overview
Problem
Conventional ultra wideband (UWB) ranging systems are vulnerable to attacks due to the long time correlation required for accurate time-of-arrival measurements, which can be compromised by malicious signals, necessitating improved security measures for secure ranging communications.
Innovation Solution
The proposed solution involves generating and verifying ultra wideband (UWB) communications using cryptographically secure training sequences (STS) divided into subblocks, where the polarity of pulses is set based on message bits, and incorporating guard intervals, to enhance security against spoofing attacks by encoding verifier and prover messages within the STS pulses.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If long time correlation is used to accurately extract time-of-arrival from secure training sequence, then measurement precision is improved, but security is worsened due to vulnerability to attacks
Solution Approach 1:
The secure training sequence is divided into multiple subblocks, where each subblock corresponds to a specific message bit. This segmentation allows the receiver to process and verify individual bits independently through correlation, achieving both accurate time-of-arrival measurement and enhanced security by limiting the attack surface to smaller subblock segments rather than the entire long sequence
2Reliability
If cryptographically secure random sequence is included in UWB ranging packet, then security is improved, but device complexity is worsened
Solution Approach 1:
The cryptographically secure random training sequence is generated and prepared in advance before the actual ranging measurement takes place. Both transmitter and receiver pre-share or pre-generate these sequences, allowing the system to use simpler processing during the actual ranging operation while maintaining high security through the pre-established cryptographic foundation
3Use of energy by moving object
If UWB transmit and receive signal powers are kept very low, then energy consumption is reduced, but measurement precision is worsened due to difficulty in accurate time-of-arrival extraction
Solution Approach 1:
By segmenting the secure training sequence into subblocks and using each subblock to encode individual message bits, the system enables more efficient correlation processing. This allows accurate time-of-arrival extraction even at low signal powers, as the segmented structure improves the signal-to-noise ratio in correlation operations while maintaining low energy consumption
Data Source
AI summary
Methods and apparatuses are presented to generate, and verify reception of, ultra wideband (UWB) communications, e.g., to perform secure UWB ranging. Verifier and prover messages may be encoded on top of random cryptographically secure training sequence (STS) of pulses, organized in blocks such that a given block corresponds to a given message bit. In some scenarios, a first STS may be encoded using a verifier message not known to a recipient device. A second STS may be received from the recipient device, encoded with an unknown prover message. A third STS may also be received, encoded with an authentication message generated using the verifier message and the authentication message. Verification of the authentication message can therefore confirm that the recipient device received the first STS, and that the recipient device is the authentic source of the second STS. Thus, the second STS may be relied upon, e.g., for ranging calculations.