UWB Ranging STS Time Offsets for Spoofing-Resistant Positioning
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Solution Overview
Problem
UWB-based positioning is vulnerable to spoofing attacks, which can compromise the accuracy and security of position determination in wireless electronic devices.
Innovation Solution
Implementing time offsets for scrambled timestamp sequences (STS) in UWB ranging sessions, ensuring that the time offsets are shared between UWB devices to prevent spoofing by making the spoofing attempts ineffective.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If UWB-based positioning is implemented, then positioning accuracy is improved, but vulnerability to spoofing attacks increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs preliminary actions by establishing secure authentication and sharing time offset information between legitimate UWB devices before the actual ranging measurement takes place. This preliminary secure setup ensures that when positioning occurs, the devices can verify each other's identity and validate timestamp sequences, preventing spoofing attempts that arrive without proper authentication credentials.
Solution Approach 2:
The patent introduces an intermediary authentication mechanism that mediates between transmitting and receiving UWB devices. This intermediary layer verifies device identities, validates timestamp sequences, and checks time offset information, acting as a security gatekeeper that prevents spoofed signals from being accepted as legitimate ranging measurements while allowing accurate positioning to proceed.
2Reliability
If time offsets are implemented for STS, then security against spoofing is improved, but system complexity increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system changes parameters by introducing time offset values that are shared between legitimate UWB devices. Each device uses these parameter changes to validate incoming timestamp sequences, adding a layer of security verification. The parameter change approach allows the system to maintain relatively simple device architecture while achieving enhanced security through mathematical validation of time-based parameters.
3Reliability
If authentication mechanisms are added to prevent spoofing, then security is improved, but ranging time increases
Solution Approach 1:
The system applies partial authentication actions by verifying only critical security elements (device identity, timestamp sequence validity, and time offset matching) rather than performing exhaustive security checks on all signal parameters. This partial verification approach provides sufficient security against spoofing while minimizing the time added to the ranging process, as the authentication checks are designed to be computationally efficient.
Data Source
AI summary
In some implementations, a first ultra-wideband (UWB) device may determine a respective time offset for each scrambled timestamp sequence (STS) in a series of STS used for ranging in a UWB ranging session between the first UWB device and the second UWB device, wherein the respective time offset for each STS in the series of STS is determined in accordance with time offset information shared between the first UWB device and the second UWB device. The first UWB device may transmit the series of STS via UWB radio frequency (RF) signals during the UWB ranging session, wherein each STS in the series of STS is transmitted with the respective time offset.