V2X Message Verification Using Radar-Camera Fusion

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Solution Overview

Problem

Current V2X communication systems are vulnerable to malicious messages that can induce traffic congestion or collisions, as they lack effective methods to distinguish between genuine and fake vehicle locations.

Innovation Solution

A method that retrieves perception data from an ego vehicle's sensors to determine nearby objects, receives and verifies Basic Safety Messages (BSM) from V2X sources, and performs secondary checks such as speed plausibility and message consistency checks to flag malicious messages, potentially involving a roadside unit for validation.

Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles

VSEngineering Contradiction Analysis

1Reliability

If V2X communication systems accept all received messages, then communication coverage is maximized, but system reliability deteriorates due to malicious messages

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvemessage authenticityVSAvoidverification system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
ReliabilityVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent introduces perception systems (cameras, radar, lidar) as intermediary verification mechanisms. These sensors act as mediators that independently observe the physical environment and validate whether V2X messages correspond to actual vehicles and conditions, thereby verifying message authenticity without requiring complex cryptographic infrastructure

Inventive Principle:
Principle #24Intermediary (Mediator)

Solution Approach 2:

The system implements feedback loops where perception data continuously validates V2X messages in real-time. When a message is received, the perception system checks whether the described vehicle location and state match actual sensor observations, providing immediate feedback to confirm or reject message validity

Inventive Principle:
Principle #23Feedback

2Measurement precision

If perception systems are used to verify V2X messages, then message accuracy improves, but system complexity increases due to multiple sensors and processing requirements

Engineering Contradiction:
Improvevehicle location verification accuracyVSAvoidsensor fusion system complexity
Core Design Contradiction:
Measurement precisionVSDevice complexity

Solution Approach 1:

The patent applies partial verification by focusing perception system validation only on critical message elements such as vehicle location and presence, rather than verifying all message parameters. This selective approach achieves sufficient accuracy for safety-critical functions while avoiding the complexity of complete message validation

Inventive Principle:
Principle #16Partial or excessive action

Solution Approach 2:

The verification process is segmented into distinct functional modules: message reception, perception data acquisition, validation logic, and decision-making. This segmentation allows each component to be optimized independently and simplifies the overall system architecture by breaking down the complex verification task into manageable stages

Inventive Principle:
Principle #1Segmentation

Data Source

PatentUS12043272B2Radar and camera fusion based wireless communication misbehavior detection
Publication Date: 2024.07.23 GM GLOBAL TECHNOLOGY OPERATIONS LLC
  • US12043272B2 patent drawing
  • US12043272B2 patent drawing
  • US12043272B2 patent drawing

AI summary

A method of detecting a malicious wireless vehicle-to-everything (V2X) communication includes retrieving perception data from a perception system on an ego vehicle, determining information about nearby objects from the perception data, receiving a first Basic Safety Message (BSM) from a first V2X source and determining if a vehicle location indicated in the first BSM corresponds to a location visible to the ego vehicle. In the event that the vehicle location indicated in the first BSM does not correspond to a location visible to the ego vehicle, the method further includes receiving a second V2X communication from a second V2X source and determining if the second V2X communication indicates a vehicle at the vehicle location indicated in the first BSM. In the event that the second V2X communication does not indicate a vehicle at the vehicle location indicated in the first BSM, the first BSM data is flagged as malicious.