In-Vehicle Control Device Anomaly Filtering for Attack Detection
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Solution Overview
Problem
Existing methods for collecting attack information on in-vehicle LANs, such as message authentication and firewalls, struggle to detect security attacks like HTTPS communication impersonations, leading to incomplete anomaly information exclusion, especially when faults occur in communication devices.
Innovation Solution
An information collection device and system that communicates with a control device in a vehicle, using specific and usual message transmissions to determine device states and exclude anomalies, enhancing fault detection accuracy by sending messages outside and within predetermined communication methods, including invalid and valid HTTPS requests, to differentiate between internal and external security attack anomalies.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Measurement precision
If message authentication and firewall functions are used to detect security attacks, then security attack detection capability is improved, but other types of security attacks such as HTTPS communication impersonations cannot be detected
Solution Approach 1:
The center device is designed to perform multiple detection functions: it not only executes traditional message authentication and firewall functions but also conducts HTTPS communication impersonation detection by sending test messages and analyzing determination results. This multi-functional approach allows the system to detect various types of security attacks including those previously undetectable by single-function systems.
2Loss of information
If anomaly information is collected from control devices, then security attack information is gathered, but anomaly information caused by faulty ECUs cannot be distinguished from actual security attacks
Solution Approach 1:
Before collecting anomaly information from control devices during normal operation, the system performs preliminary testing by sending test messages to determine whether control devices are functioning normally. This preliminary action establishes a baseline of normal device behavior, enabling subsequent differentiation between anomalies caused by faulty devices and those caused by actual security attacks.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements a feedback mechanism where determination results from test messages are used to adjust anomaly information collection. When a control device is determined to be normal, its anomaly information is collected and analyzed. When a device is determined to be faulty, its anomaly information is excluded from security attack analysis. This feedback loop ensures high accuracy in security attack detection.
3Measurement precision
If multiple message transmissions are performed to enhance fault detection accuracy, then detection accuracy is improved, but communication overhead and system complexity increase
Solution Approach 1:
The message transmission process is segmented into distinct phases: first, test messages are sent to determine device normality; second, based on the determination result, either anomaly information is collected (if normal) or the process is terminated (If faulty). This segmentation allows multiple message transmissions to be performed systematically without creating excessive complexity, as each phase has a clear purpose and decision point.
Data Source
AI summary
An information collection device including a processor and a communication unit that communicates with a control device installed at a vehicle. The processor is configured to send a message in a specific way to the control device that is in a test mode, receive from the control device a determination result about a state of the control device which has been determined based on the message sent in the specific way, send another message in a usual way to the control device in a case in which the determination result indicates that the state of the control device is normal, and receive, from the control device, anomaly information relating to communication in the control device, in response to the other message sent in the usual way.