In-Vehicle Remote Attestation Using HSM Memory Integrity Checks
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Solution Overview
Problem
Interdependent systems in in-vehicle networks are vulnerable to malicious interference, compromising the integrity and correct functioning of interconnected components, particularly in automotive applications with centralized computers.
Innovation Solution
Implementing a secure enclave with a Hardware Security Module (HSM) to generate authentication tokens and execute Run-Time Integrity Checks (RTIC) and Challenge-Response Protocols (CRP) to ensure memory integrity, using a Remote Attestation Key (RAK) to prevent unauthorized access and enable fail-safe measures upon integrity breaches.
Engineering Contradictions & Design Principles
Engineering Contradiction Analysis
1Device complexity
If centralized computers are used in automotive E/E architectures, then device complexity is reduced, but reliability of individual computers increases in importance
Solution Approach 1:
The system divides the centralized computer into isolated functional domains using virtualization, creating separate execution environments (domains) that are mutually isolated. This segmentation allows the overall system to maintain lower complexity while individual domains preserve high reliability through isolation boundaries that prevent compromise propagation.
Solution Approach 2:
A domain manager acts as an intermediary component that mediates between different virtualized domains and the underlying hardware resources. This intermediary enforces isolation policies, manages resource allocation, and ensures that compromises in one domain cannot affect other domains, thereby maintaining reliability while preserving system-wide simplicity.
2Adaptability or versatility
If systems are interconnected in in-vehicle networks, then functionality and integration are improved, but vulnerability to malicious interference increases
Solution Approach 1:
The network communication system is segmented into isolated virtualized domains where each domain handles specific communication functions. This segmentation allows high integration and adaptability across domains while containing malicious interference within individual domain boundaries, preventing network-wide compromise.
Solution Approach 2:
The system implements preliminary security measures by establishing trust boundaries and authentication mechanisms before inter-domain communication occurs. Domain managers pre-validate communication requests and enforce access policies, preventing malicious interference from propagating across the interconnected network while maintaining versatile system integration.
3Measurement precision
If memory integrity checks are performed frequently, then detection of adversarial attacks is improved, but processing overhead and system performance increase
Solution Approach 1:
The system performs integrity measurements selectively rather than continuously on all memory regions. The domain manager focuses measurements on critical code and data segments that are most susceptible to adversarial modification, achieving high detection accuracy while minimizing the processing overhead associated with comprehensive continuous monitoring.
Solution Approach 2:
Memory integrity checking is segmented into domain-specific measurement tasks managed by individual domain managers. Each domain manager monitors only its own domain's memory regions, distributing the measurement burden and reducing overall processing overhead while maintaining precise attack detection through focused monitoring of critical memory segments.
Data Source
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AI summary
A method for remote attestation over in-vehicle network includes generating an authentication token in a first Hardware Security Module (HSM) of a first system, wherein the authentication token identifies a data content of a memory. A Run-Time Integrity Check using the authentication token in the first HSM is executed to determine a state of the memory of the first system. A key usage flag of a key is modified in response to the state of the memory. A Challenge-Response Protocol (CRP) is executed between a first Remote Attestation (RA) module of the first HSM and a second RA module of a second HSM of the second system, wherein the first RA module is responsive to the key usage flag. A security measure is executed in response to a failed CRP.